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Foreword 
The Technical Report describes the recent features incorporated in the RHOMOLO model 
and shows in a practical fashion the flexibility of the new modelling framework by 
presenting the results of a number of simulation exercises. The paper illustrates the 
effect of permanent demand-side shock in the perturbed regions and the associated 
spillover effects in the non-perturbed regions. Furthermore, in this paper the authors test 
the extent to which a gradual increase in the upward pressure on wages generated by a 
domestic increase in demand can affect the magnitude of the economic impacts in the 
long-run through competitiveness effects and the degree to which this could results in 
changes in trade patterns. 
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Abstract 
In this paper we provide the mathematical presentation of the RHOMOLO model. In 
addition, we perform some stylized and illustrative simulations with the aim to make the 
reader familiar with the economic adjustment mechanisms incorporated into the model. 
Essentially, we attempt to offer the reader and the potential users of the model an 
intuition of the transmission channels existing in the current version RHOMOLO. The 
analysis is kept simple to facilitate a better understanding of the model's findings. We 
simulate a permanent demand-side shock implemented separately for each of the 267 
regions contained in the model. We repeat the same simulation under three alternative 
labour market closures and three different imperfectly competitive product market 
structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Numerical General Equilibrium Models, Regional Economic Adjustment, 
Regional spillover.  
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1. Introduction 
 
RHOMOLO is a spatial computable general equilibrium model of the European 
Commission, developed by the Directorate-General Joint Research Centre (DG JRC) in 
collaboration with the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) to 
support the EU policy makers providing sector-, region- and time-specific simulations on 
investment policies and structural reforms. The RHOMOLO model has been used with DG 
REGIO for the impact assessment of Cohesion Policy and structural reforms, and with the 
European Investment Bank for impact assessment of EU investment support policies. 
 
The aim of the Technical Report is twofold. Firstly we fully describe the recent features 
incorporated in the RHOMOLO model, and secondly we use the model to run a number of 
simulation exercises with the purpose of testing the model's ability to generate results 
consistent with stylized facts arising from different assumptions about the underlying 
structure of the model and demonstrate in a practical fashion the flexibility of the new 
modelling framework.  
 
Previous applications of the model were based on Mercenier et al., (2016). In this new 
version of the model we insert new features with the aim of making our modelling 
framework more consistent with the regional economic literature. Furthermore, some of 
the revisions we made reflect comments and feedbacks received from an external Review 
Board in April 2016.1 Compared to Mercenier et al., (2016), the new version of the 
RHOMOLO model incorporates a number of labour market options, the possibility to 
easily switch among perfectly and imperfectly competitive commodity markets of various 
types, a new treatment of public capital expenditures and more thorough treatment of 
factor mobility.  
 
On the labour market side we are now able to choose among a variety of options for 
wage setting. Among different ways of modelling imperfectly competitive commodity 
markets, the model can deploy both a simple monopolistic competition framework à la 
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and different forms of oligopolistic competition with endogenous 
number of firms.  
 
In addition, in this new version of the model we differentiate between current and capital 
government spending. Both spending types are reported in the government budget, yet 
only capital spending is allowed to generate direct supply-side effects. Public capital stock 
enters the production function as an unpaid factor, therefore freely available to all firms. 
Yet, we take into account congestion effects arising from the contemporaneous, 
uncoordinated use of public goods2, adjusting the public capital stock through a simple 
model of congestion (as in Edwards, 1990, Turnovsky and Fisher, 1995 and Fisher and 
Turnovsky, 1998).3  
 
When modelling regional economies, within a CGE framework, one should take into 
account that typically regions are more open than their national counterparts. Hence, 
closures rules normally in operation in national economies can not necessarily be applied 
straightforwardly when modelling regional economies (see Lecca et al., 2013 and Partrige 
and Rickman, 2008). For this reason, as a default option, we separate the investment 
from saving decisions. Households' savings are determined as fixed shares of current 
income while regional investments are determined through a simple adjustment rule, 
according to which the additional level of investments in each region is governed by the 
gap between the desired level of capital and the actual level of capital. This is a typical 
                                                          
1 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/review_of_the_rhomolo_model_final.pdf. 
2 Such as non-publicness of public goods (see e.g., Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973).  
3 A substantial part of public capital such as roads, highways, bridges, airports etc are clearly not public goods 
and individuals can be excluded at some cost from using the good (see e.g., Stiglitz and Rosengrand, 2015, Ch. 
5). This maybe even more pronounced at the regional level. 
 5 
 
accelerator model, as originally developed by Jorgenson and Stephenson (1969) and 
consistent with the capital adjustment rules of Uzawa (1969). Everything else equal, 
higher user costs of capital are associated with lower desired capital stock and 
disinvestments due to lower profits. In this framework, the balance of payments is 
satisfied by not imposing any constraints on net inflows from the rest of regions. This 
also means that the demand for investment in excess of domestic savings is fully 
compensated by external markets.  
 
The migration module is now fully integrated in this new version of RHOMOLO. As in 
previous applications (see e.g., Brandsma et al., 2014), we assume that there is no 
natural population change in the baseline. However the labour force in each region 
adjusts according to a migration function originally developed in Persyn et al., (2014). 
The model starts with a zero net migration flow and in any period migration between 
each region pair is positively related to gaps in real wages (hence, not only nominal 
wages but also regional costs of living matter) and negatively related to gaps in 
unemployment rates. Since the relocation of workers across regions may have a 
significant impact on the pattern of the regional consumption and on local wages, labour 
mobility is likely to have a non-negligible impact on the spatial outcomes of the model. 
 
All shift and share parameters of the model are calibrated to reproduce the base-year 
dataset, represented by new the inter-regional social accounting matrix for the year 2013 
(Thissen et al., 2018). This is the most recent year for which regional social accounting 
matrices can be built with a sufficient degree of reliability due to data availability. 
 
In line with their pedagogical objective, the simulations and analyses undertaken in the 
paper are deliberately simple, practically oriented, and reasonably comprehensive. At the 
risk of some oversimplifications, we perform simulations with demand-side implications 
only. Essentially, we focus on a raise in internal demand in each of the 267 regions 
constituting the model, undertaking analysis for each of the main labour market 
assumptions incorporated in the model. It is our intention to investigate to what extent 
alternative adjustment mechanisms associated to given labour market assumptions affect 
the long-run impact of each economy perturbed. Separately simulating shocks to each 
individual region, we analyse the extent to which a single regional economy is able to 
transmit the received shocks to the rest of the regions and the degree at which such 
spillovers vary according to the wage structure assumed.  
 
We perform the initial set of simulations assuming perfectly competitive product markets. 
However, in the rest of the paper we conduct a further set of experiments to evaluate 
how significant the distinction is between alternative market frameworks and whether 
perfectly or imperfectly competitive commodity markets can alter the transmission 
mechanisms, the direction and sign of the spillovers. Again, for heuristic reasons and for 
the sake of comparability with the previous set of simulations, the same demand-side 
shock is implemented under the different imperfectly competitive markets structure built 
in RHOMOLO. Besides, we track the resulting agglomeration (dispersion) effects that 
might occur in terms of firms' geographical concentration and evaluate how alternative 
labour market closures influence the size and the sign of the impact while switching 
among different market frameworks.      
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we outline the 
equations and adjustment mechanisms governing the model to help the reader to 
identify the main drivers and determinants of the spatial outcomes generated by the 
RHOMOLO model. In Section 3, we describe the alternative model options incorporated in 
this new version of RHOMOLO whilst in Section 4 the calibration strategy is discussed. 
Section 5 is dedicated to the discussion of the default assumptions used in RHOMOLO. 
Section 6 presents and discusses the results of the simulations and finally Section 7 
offers some conclusions. 
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2. Detailed description of the RHOMOLO model 
 
2.1 An overview of the model 
The theoretical structure of the model is common to other numerical general equilibrium 
model. The economy consists of a set of 268 regions indexed by 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑅 + 1 of which a 
subset corresponds to R=267 endogenous EU NUTS2 regions, which we index as 
𝑟 =  1, … , 𝑅; and one single exogenous region representing the Rest of the World.  
 
The model has a set of different economic sectors (also called industries) indexed by 𝑖 ∈
𝑰. A subset of these industries indexed by 𝑓 ∈ 𝑭 ⊂ 𝑰 operates -in the default configuration 
of the model- under monopolistic competition a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In each 
region-sector (𝑟, 𝑓) identical firms produce a differentiated variety, which is considered an 
imperfect substitute for the varieties produced within the same region and elsewhere. 
The number of varieties in the sectors F is endogenous and determined from the zero-
profit equilibrium condition, according to which profits must be equal to fixed costs. In 
turn, this means that in equilibrium prices equal average costs. The rest of firms operate 
under perfect competition in sectors indexed by 𝑐 ∈ 𝑪 ⊂ 𝑰. Currently RHOMOLO is 
disaggregated into 267 EU regions and 10 NACE rev.2 economic sectors as reported in 
Table 1: A, B_E, C, F, G-I, J, K-L, M-N, O-Q, R-U.  
 
 
Table 1. Sectoral classification used in RHOMOLO 
CODE 
NACE 
REV 2 
 Sectors Description 
A Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
B,D,E 
Mining and Quarrying + Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning 
Supply + Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste Management and 
Remediation Activities 
C Manufacturing 
F Construction 
G-I 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
+ Transportation and Storage + Accommodation and Food Service 
Activities 
J Information and Communication 
K-L Financial and Insurance Activities/ Real Estate Activities 
M_N 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities + Administrative and 
Support Service Activities 
O-Q 
Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 
+ Education + Human Health and Social Work Activities 
R-U 
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation + Other Service Activities + 
Activities of Households As Employers; Undifferentiated Goods- and 
Services-Producing Activities of Households for Own Use + Activities of 
Extraterritorial Organisations and Bodies 
 
 
Final goods are consumed by Households, Governments and Investors (in the form of 
capital goods), whilst firms consume intermediate inputs. Regional goods are produced 
by combining the value added (labour and capital) with domestic and imported 
intermediates, creating vertical linkages between firms. This means that the spatial 
configuration of the system of regions has a direct impact on the competitiveness of 
regions because firms located in more accessible regions can source their intermediate 
inputs at lower price and thus gain larger market shares in local markets.  
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Trade between and within regions is costly, implying that the shipping of goods entails 
transport costs assumed to be of the iceberg type, with 1 + 𝜏𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 ≥ 1 representing the 
quantity of sector j goods that needs to be sent from region r in order to have one unit 
arriving in region r'  (see Krugman, 1991, for instance). Transport costs are identical 
across varieties but specific to sectors and trading partners (region pairs). They are 
based on the transport costs estimation developed by Persyn et al., (2018) explained in 
section 4.2.  
 
Typically, we assume the following sectors under perfectly competitive market structure: 
A, O-Q and R-U. The rest are normally treated as imperfectly competitive sectors.   
 
The model distinguishes three different labour categories which correspond to the level of 
skill or education e={low, medium, high}  For each labour type, the default wage setting 
relationship is represented by a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995), whose 
implication is that lower levels of unemployment increase workers' bargaining power, 
thereby increasing real wages.  
 
The following sections provide a more detailed description of the model. 
 
2.2 Households 
In each period4, t and in each region r, households receive utility from consumption of 
the composite good 𝐶𝑟.
 The household’s problem consists in the maximisation of the 
utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2): 
 
𝑈(𝐶𝑟) (1)  
𝑃𝑟
𝑐𝐶𝑟 ≤ (1 − 𝑠𝑟)𝑌𝐶𝑟 (2)  
 
where, 𝑃𝑟
𝑐, 𝑠𝑟, 𝑌𝐶𝑟 are the consumer price index, the exogenous saving rate and the 
disposable income respectively. 𝑌𝐶𝑟, is defined as the sum of labour and capital income 
adjusted for tax and net transfers of income:   
 
𝑌𝐶𝑟 = ∑(1 − 𝜏𝑟
𝑤)𝑊𝑟,𝑒𝐿𝑟,𝑒(1 − 𝑢𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒
+ ∑ 𝜓𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝑟
𝜋)𝐾𝑟,𝑖
𝑃  𝑟𝑘𝑟,𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑇𝑅𝑟 (3)  
 
where 𝜓𝑟 is the share of capital income paid directly to households and 𝜏𝑟
𝑤, 𝜏𝑟
𝜋 are the 
average rate of labour and capital income tax, respectively. Factor payments are 
represented by 𝑊𝑟,𝑒 and 𝑟𝑟, that is, the nominal wage rate differentiated by skill-types e, 
and the rate of return to capital, respectively. 𝐾𝑟
𝑃 is the private capital stock while 𝐿𝑟,𝑒 and 
𝑢𝑟,𝑒 are the labour force and unemployment rate differentiated by skill-types, e. 𝑇𝑅𝑟 are 
net transfers from government. 
 
The first order condition of this problem implies that the aggregate consumption level is 
directly related to the disposable income 𝑌𝐶𝑟: 
 
𝐶𝑟 =
(1 − 𝑠𝑟)𝑌𝐶𝑟
𝑃𝑟
𝑐  
(4)  
 
where, (1 − 𝑠𝑟) is the share of disposable income allocated to consumption. Households 
consume all varieties of final goods available in the economy. In order to represent love 
for variety, 𝐶𝑟 is assumed to take the form of a CES function defined in Equation (5): 
 
                                                          
4 For the sake of readability, we omit time indices when describing static equations. 
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𝐶𝑟 = (∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑖𝜗𝑟,𝑖 (𝑐𝑟,𝑖)
𝜌𝑐
𝑖
)
1
𝜌𝑐
 (5)  
 
where 𝑐𝑟,𝑖 is the consumption of each n=1…N varieties of sector i, in region r, whilst 𝜗𝑟,𝑖 is 
a share of expenditure parameter and 𝜌𝑐 =
𝜎𝑐−1
𝜎𝑐
 , where 𝜎𝑐is the elasticity of substitution. 
The consumption price index 𝑃𝑟
𝑐 is obtained through a weighted CES index defined over 
the Armington price for each of the varieties, 𝑃𝑟,𝑖 (this is defined below in Equation (22)):   
 
𝑃𝑟
𝑐 = (∑ 𝜗𝑟,𝑖 (𝑃𝑟,𝑖)
𝜌𝑐
𝑖
)
1
𝜌𝑐
 (6)  
 
The nominal level of saving, 𝑆𝑟 is determined in fixed share of disposable income: 
 
 
𝑆𝑟 = 𝑠𝑟𝑌𝐶𝑟 (7)  
 
2.3 Government 
Government expenditure comprises of current spending on goods and services 𝐺𝑟,𝑗, 
capital expenditures dedicated to the construction of public infrastructure 𝐼𝑟
𝑔
 and net 
transfers to households 𝑇𝑅𝑟. Revenues are generated by labour and capital income taxes 
on household income at the rate of 𝜏𝑟
𝑤 and 𝜏𝑟
𝜋, respectively, and indirect taxes on 
production 𝑍𝑟,𝑗 at the rate of 𝜏𝑟
𝑝
. The government deficit (or surplus) is represented in 
Equation (8): 
 
𝐵𝑟 = ∑ 𝐺𝑗,𝑟 +
𝑗
𝐼𝑟
𝑔 + 𝑇𝑟𝑟
− (𝜏𝑟
𝑤 ∑ 𝑊𝑒𝐿𝑟,𝑒(1 − 𝑢𝑟,𝑒)
𝑒
+ 𝜓𝑟𝜏𝑟
𝜋𝐾𝑟
𝑃 𝑟𝑘𝑟 + ∑ 𝜏𝑟
𝑝𝑍𝑟′,𝑗𝑃𝑟,𝑗
𝑗
) 
(8)  
 
In our default configuration we assume exogenous government consumption and no 
variations in tax rates, therefore no binding constraint on government budget applies. 
We assume current and capital government expenditure not dominated by endogenous 
mechanisms or government rational decisions. For the sort of simulations performed in 
RHOMOLO these variables are typically set as exogenous policy variables. However, when 
a balanced budget is applied, government deficit B is fixed, therefore either government 
consumption (current or capital expenditures) or any of the labor or capital  income tax 
rates have to adjust residually  in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. 𝐼𝑟
𝑔
 is 
distributed among sectors in fixed shares: 
 
𝐼𝑟,𝑖
𝑔𝑆 = 𝑧𝑟,𝑖𝐼𝑟
𝑔
 (9)  
 
where, 𝐼𝑟,𝑖
𝑔𝑠
is the public sectoral capital good produced by sector i in region r according to 
the base year share 𝑧𝑟,𝑖. Net transfers to Households are fixed in real terms, therefore the 
base year values 𝑇𝑟̅̅ ?̅? is simply augmented to reflect changes in prices: 
  
𝑇𝑟𝑟 = 𝑇𝑟̅̅ ?̅? 𝑃𝑟
𝑐 (10)  
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2.4  Firms 
At the level of firm, the production technology is represented by a multilevel CES function 
graphically represented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical Production structure 
 
 
 
 
In each sector j, and region r, total production 𝑍𝑟,𝑗 is a CES combination of the value 
added 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 and intermediate inputs 𝑉𝑟,𝑗:  
 
𝑍𝑟,𝑗 = 𝐴𝑥𝑟,𝑗 [𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑥 ∙ 𝑉𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑥
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑋 ) ∙ 𝑌𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑥
]
1
𝜌𝑗
𝑥
 (11)  
 
where 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑥  is the calibrated share of intermediate inputs in sector j for region r in total 
production while 𝐴𝑥𝑟,𝑗 is a scale parameter and 𝜌𝑗
𝑥 is the elasticity parameter obtained 
from the elasticity of substitution 𝜎𝑥, according to 𝜌𝑗
𝑥 =
𝜎𝑥−1
𝜎𝑥
. The corresponding demand 
equations for Y and V are described below in equation (12) and (13) respectively: 
 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗 = (𝐴𝑥𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑥
∙ (1 − 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑥 ) ∙
𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗
𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑗
)
1
1−𝜌𝑗
𝑥
∙ 𝑍𝑟,𝑗 (12)  
 
𝑉𝑟,𝑗 = (𝐴𝑥𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑥
∙ 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑥 ∙
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑗
𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑗
)
1
1−𝜌𝑗
𝑥
Z𝑟,𝑗 (13)  
 
where 𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑗, 𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗 and 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑗 are the prices for the total production, the value added and 
the intermediate inputs, respectively.  
 
In turn 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 and 𝑉𝑟,𝑗 are defined as follow in equations (14) and (15) respectively: 
 
Output 
Value added 
Capital Labour 
Low skills 
Medium skills 
High Skills 
Intermediate 
inputs 
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𝑌𝑟,𝑗 = 𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗 [(𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 )
𝜉
[𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑌 ∙ 𝐾𝐷𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑦 ) ∙ 𝐿𝐷𝑟,𝑗
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
]
1
𝜌
𝑗
𝑦
] − 𝐹𝐶𝑟,𝑗 (14)  
𝑉𝑟,𝑗 = (∑ 𝑏𝑟,𝑖,𝑗𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
𝜌𝑣
𝑖
)
1
𝜌𝑣
 (15)  
 
In equation (14), 𝑌𝑟,𝑗, is obtained combining private capital 𝐾𝐷𝑟,𝑗 and employment 𝐿𝐷𝑟,𝑗 in 
a CES function, net of fixed costs 𝐹𝐶𝑟,𝑗. The scale parameter 𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗 represents the 
conventional Hicks neutral technical change parameter in this production function. 
 
Effective public capital, 𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑  enters the production function as unpaid factor of production 
(Barro, 1990; Baxter and King, 1993; Futugami et al., 1993 and Glomm and Ravikumar, 
1994; 1997) meaning that all firms, in all sectors, enjoy the same level of public capital 
at no cost. In Equation (14) the conditions are such that the value added production 
function exhibits positive marginal productivity for all three factors and diminishing 
returns for each single input. This function exhibits constant return to scale between 
private-primary factors of production {𝐾𝐷,𝐿𝐷}, however {𝐾𝐷,𝐿𝐷,𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 } combined together 
generate increasing return to scale. Substitution between the two types of primary 
factors is governed by the parameter of substitution  𝜌𝑗
𝑦 =
𝜎𝑦−1
𝜎𝑦
 (where 𝜎𝑦 is the elasticity 
of substitution between labour and capital) and the share parameter 𝛿𝑗
𝑦
. The output 
elasticity of public capital, 𝜉, is typically positive and less than 1.  
 
The input-output relations are shown in equation (15) where the composite demand for 
intermediate inputs is again a CES combination of 𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 that is the purchase of 
intermediate inputs of each sectors j from the supplier sector i. Input substitution 
between sectors are determined by the elasticity of substitution 𝜌𝑣 =
𝜎𝑣−1
𝜎𝑣
and the 
preference parameter related to the share of expenditure 𝑏𝑟,𝑖,𝑗.  
 
The composite CES price index for the intermediate inputs is determined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑗
1−𝜎𝑣 = ∑ 𝑏𝑟,𝑖,𝑗𝑝𝑟,𝑖
1−𝜎𝑣
𝑖
 (16)  
 
The production price is then defined below: 
 
𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑖𝑍𝑟,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑖𝑌𝑟,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑖𝑉𝑟,𝑖 (17)  
 
 
From cost minimization and given equations (14) and (15) we obtain the demand for 
capital and labour in each sector j, represented in equation (17) and (18) respectively:  
 
𝐾𝐷𝑟,𝑗 = (((𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 )
𝜉
𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗)
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
∙ 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑦 ∙
𝑟𝑘𝑟,𝑗
𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗
)
1
1−𝜌
𝑗
𝑦
∙ 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 (18)  
𝐿𝐷𝑟,𝑗 = (((𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 )
𝜉
𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗)
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
(1 − 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑦 ) ∙
𝑊𝑟
𝑃𝑦
𝑟,𝑗
)
1
1−𝜌
𝑗
𝑦
∙ 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 (19)  
 
where, 𝑟𝑘𝑟,𝑗 and 𝑊𝑟 are respectively the price of capital and the wage rate. For each firms, 
labour is then further disaggregated. We distinguish between three types of skills, e: low, 
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medium and high. The demand for different types of skill labour is identified in equation 
(20): 
 
𝑙𝑑𝑟,𝑗,𝑒 = (𝐴𝑙𝑟,𝑗,𝑒
𝜌𝑗
𝑙
∙ 𝛿𝑟,𝑗,𝑒
𝑙 ∙
𝑤𝑟,𝑒
𝑊𝑟
)
1
1−𝜌𝑗
𝑙
∙ 𝐿𝐷𝑟,𝑗                 𝑒 = 𝑙𝑒, 𝑚𝑒, ℎ𝑒 
(20)  
 
where, 𝐴𝑙𝑟,𝑗,𝑒, 𝛿𝑟,𝑗,𝑒 and 𝜌𝑗
𝑙are the scale paramenter, the share parameter and the 
substitution parameter, respectively. 𝑤𝑟,𝑒is the wage rate for each e.  
 
2.5 Trade 
Goods and services can be sold in the domestic economy or exported to other regions. 
On the other hand, firms and consumers can purchase inputs within the region or from 
external markets. We use a single Armington nest that differentiates between domestic 
and imported (intermediate inputs and final demand) goods and services. At the level of 
firm the demand for each good and services, j, supplied by region s to region s', 𝑥𝑠,s′,𝑗, is 
defined as follows: 
 
𝑥𝑠,s′,𝑗 = 𝑑𝑠,𝑠′,𝑗 (
𝑃𝑠′,𝑗
𝑝𝑠,𝑠′,𝑗
)
𝜎𝑗
𝑋𝑠′,𝑗;            𝜎𝑗 ≥ 0;   (21)  
 
 
where, 𝑑𝑠,𝑠′,𝑖, is a calibrated expenditure share, 𝜎𝑗 is the elasticity of substitution and 𝑋𝑠,𝑖 is 
the Armington aggregate of outputs for each firm in region s defined below in equation 
(38). Having external prices fixed to one (such as, import prices from the Rest of the 
World), the price 𝑃𝑟′,𝑗 is defined as a CES price index over the market price 𝑝𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗: 
 
𝑃𝑟′,𝑗 = (∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑗𝑑𝑟,𝑟′,𝑖,(1 + 𝜏𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗)(1 + 𝜏𝑟
𝑝)𝑝𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗
𝑟
)
1−𝜎𝑗
𝑟 ⊂ 𝑠 (22)  
 
 
where the price 𝑝𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 set by a firm of region r (net of trade cost 𝜏 and production taxes 
𝜏𝑟
𝑝
) selling to region r', for a monopolistic competitive sectors f, is defined as the optimal 
mark-up (
1
𝜀𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓
) over the marginal cost 𝑃𝑟,𝑓
∗ , is given as follows: 
𝑝𝒓,𝑠′,𝑓 =
𝑃𝑟,𝑓
∗
1 −
1
𝜀𝑟,𝑠′,𝑓
 
(23)  
 
where, 𝜀𝑟,𝑠′,𝑓 is the perceived elasticity that in monopolistic competition is defined as  
follows: 
 
𝜀𝑟,𝑠′,𝑓 = 𝜎𝑠′,𝑓;       𝑓 ∈ 𝑖; (24)  
 
For the perfectly competitive sectors the market price is equal to the marginal cost, that 
is: 
 
𝑝𝒓,𝑠′,𝑐 = 𝑃𝑟,𝑐
∗ ;        𝑐 ∈ 𝑖; (25)  
 
In this default configuration of RHOMOLO we use a Dixit-Stiglitz formulation of the mark-
up of firm-level product differentiation where the mark-up rate is kept constant. The 
elasticities of substitution that define the perceive elasticity in the Lerner formulation is 
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equal for all firms and products in the model. The elasticity of substitution 𝜎 is the same 
in each node of the CES function (between home –and imported), therefore any possible 
combination between domestic and imported inputs will collapse to a single nest as 
represented in equation (21).  
 
The marginal cost includes the cost of production factors and the intermediate price 
index:  
 
𝑃𝑟,𝑗
∗ = 𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝑦 𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗 + 𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑗 (26)  
 
𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝑦
 and 𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝐼𝑛𝑡 are the share parameters attached to the value added and intermediate 
inputs respectively.  
 
2.6 Wage setting 
The RHOMOLO model incorporates imperfect competition in the labour market. We 
assume a flexible framework that allows one to switch from a wage curve to a Phillips 
curve. Further parameterization also permits to use a dynamic or a static form of wage 
setting. The general formulation is expressed in logs as in Equation (27): 
 
𝑟𝑤𝑟,𝑒,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑒 + 𝛼 𝑟𝑤𝑟,𝑒,𝑡−1 − 𝛽 𝑢𝑟,𝑒,𝑡 + ς ∆𝑝𝑟,𝑡 − 𝜃∆𝑢𝑟,𝑒,𝑡 + 𝜔Γ𝑡 (27)  
 
The real wage 𝑟𝑤𝑒,𝑡 is differentiated by skills, e, and it is negatively related to the 
unemployment rate, 𝑢𝑒,𝑡 and the change in unemployment rate between two subsequent 
periods, ∆𝑢𝑒,𝑡. The real wage is also positively affected by past real wages, changes in the 
price of output between two subsequent periods, ∆𝑝𝑟,𝑡 and the productivity trend  Γ𝑡.  In 
the baseline model we assume Γ𝑡 = 0 and the constant 𝑎 is a calibrated parameter. 5  
 
With 𝛼 =  ς = 𝜃 = 0 we have the case of a static wage curve where the real wage is solely 
affected by the unemployment rate, while for the case where  𝛼 = 1 the changes in real 
wages between two subsequent periods are dependent from current level of 
unemployment rate. In this last configuration, a Phillips curve is in operation in the 
model6. This implies that in the absence of migration or exogenous increases in labour 
forces, in the long-run the employment and the unemployment rate will return back to 
their previous steady-state.  
 
For values 0 < 𝛼 < 1 some inertia is captured in the way wages adjust in the model. 
Recent econometric evidence has shown value of 𝛼 significantly less than 1 (Montuenga-
Gómez, V.M., Ramos-Parreño, 2005). However the debate is still open and the issue 
currently remain controversial.  
 
2.7 Investment 
The optimal path of private IP investments is consistent with the neoclassical firm's profit 
maximisation theory and defined as in Uzawa (1969): 
 
𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑃 = 𝛿𝑟𝐾𝑖,𝑟
𝑃 (
𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑟
𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟
)
𝑣
 (28)  
                                                          
5 Currently the model does not incorporate any endogenous determination of the productivity parameter. 
However this could be exogenously fixed if estimates for the 267 NUTS 2 regions were available. 
 
6
 If 𝛼, ς, 𝜃 > 0 we are introducing a type of a dynamic adjustment over wage bargaining.  
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where, v is the accelerator parameter and 𝛿 is the depreciation rate. According to this 
formulation the investment capital ratio (𝜑 = 𝐼𝑟
𝑃/𝐾𝑟
𝑃) is a function of the rate of return to 
capital (𝑟𝑘) and the user cost of capital (𝑢𝑐𝑘), allowing the capital stock to reach its 
desired level in a smooth fashion over time: 
  
𝜑 =  𝜑(𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑟 , 𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟) (29)  
where 
 
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝑟𝑘
> 0;  
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝑢𝑐𝑘
< 0 (30)  
 
The user cost of capital, uck, is derived from Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Jorgenson 
(1963) as a typical no arbitrage condition, where: 
 
𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟 = (𝑟 + 𝛿𝑟)𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼 + ∆𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼 + 𝑟𝑝𝑟 (31)  
 
r, 𝛿𝑟,𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼 and 𝑟𝑝𝑟  denote the interest rate, the depreciation rates, the investment price 
index at EU level and an exogenous risk premium respectively. ∆𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼  is the change of the 
investment price index defined between two subsequent periods. 
 
Given equation (30) and the production function (14) we can define the desired level of 
capital 𝐾𝑗,𝑟
∗  as follows: 
𝐾𝑗,𝑟
∗ = 𝑁𝑟,𝑗 (((𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 )
𝜉
𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗)
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
∙ 𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑦 ∙
𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟,𝑗
𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗
)
1
1−𝜌
𝑗
𝑦
∙ 𝑌𝑟,𝑗 (32)  
  
Equation (32) is similar to Equation (18) except for the price associated to capital, which 
is in this case 𝑢𝑐𝑘  rather than 𝑟𝑘. 
 
In this configuration, it is the gap between the desired level of capital and the actual level 
of capital that determine the expected profit in the economy which in turn drive 
investment in a given period. This is governed by the differences between uck and  rk, 
therefore.  Dividing member by member Equation (32) with Equation (18) and totally 
differentiating, we have therefore: ?̇?∗ − 𝐾?̇? = 𝑟?̇? − 𝑢𝑐𝑘̇ . 
 
In Equation (31) the interest rate is fixed and equal for all regions; 𝛿𝑟 is fixed but we 
allow variations between regions in the base year; 𝑟𝑝𝑟 is a fixed calibrated parameter. 
Therefore changes in 𝑢𝑐𝑘 are only driven by changes in the cost of capital in the whole 
EU, 𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼 . This is given as the price index over the Armington price weighted by the capital 
matrix KM: 
 
𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼 =
∑ 𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟𝑃𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑟
∑ 𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟?̅?𝑟,𝑖𝑖,𝑗,𝑟
 (33)  
 
As depicted in Equation (28) the allocation of investments between regions is driven by 
the differences between regional and EU average returns that mimic, a capital flow 
mobility rule between regions. In the long-run, we should expect changes in capital 
returns in all regions to equalise. 
 
Private capital stock in each region updates period by period through investments 
adjusted by depreciation: 
 
∆𝐾𝑗,𝑟
𝑃 = −𝛿𝑟𝐾𝑗,𝑟
𝑃 + 𝐼𝑗,𝑟
𝑃  (34)  
 
 14 
 
The demand for investments 𝐼𝑗,𝑟
𝑃  in sector j is translated to the production of investment 
goods produced by sectors i, 𝐼𝑗,𝑟
𝑆 , through the capital matrixes  𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟as follows: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑆 = ∑ 𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟𝐼𝑗,𝑟
𝑃
𝑗
 (35)  
 
Official statistics typically do not provide a capital matrix at regional level. The capital 
matrixes  𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟 is therefore obtained and estimated for each region through a method of 
minimization of distances detailed in Section 4.2. 
  
2.8 Public capital accumulation and congestion 
Public capital stock accumulates through public investment in infrastructure, 𝐼𝑟
𝐺, set 
exogenously by each government starting from an initial positive capital stock. Public 
capital stock accumulates in accordance with the following formula: 
 
∆𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑠 = −𝛿𝑟
𝑔𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑃 + 𝐼𝑟
𝐺 (36)  
 
where government capital depreciates at the rate 𝛿𝑟
𝑔
. 
 
In RHOMOLO we take into account of congestion effects arising from non-publicness of 
public goods (see e.g., Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Stiglitz and Rosengrand 2015); 
therefore the public capital stock, 𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑠  is adjusted following a simple model of congestion 
(see e.g. Edwards, 1990, Turnovsky and Fisher, 1995 and Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998)7. 
The congestion model we use follows the traditional formulation of decreasing marginal 
congestion. The aggregate public capital service appearing in equation (14) is adjusted 
for congestion by aggregated production:   
 
𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑑 = 𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑠 (∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑖𝑌𝑟,𝑖
𝑖
)
𝛾
            𝛾 =
𝜂 − 1
𝜂
, 𝛾 ∈ (0, −∞);          𝜂 ∈ (0,1) (37)  
 
where, 𝛾 is the congestion parameter. The increase in production reduces the effective 
quantity of public capital stock enjoyable by all firms and the magnitude of this effect 
depends on the level of  𝜂. When 𝜂 = 1 (𝛾 = 0) we have the case of a pure public good, 
which is available equally to each firm and its use would not reduce its usefulness to 
others and firms will enjoy full benefits from its use (non-rival and non-excludable). If 
𝜂 = 05 (𝛾 = −1) public capital still remains non-excludable but loses the property of non-
rivalry8.. The quantity of public services available to a producer declines if production 
increases. The higher is the use of primary factors the lower is the contribution of public 
capital in production. Such a crowding effect is stronger the lower is  𝜂. For  𝜂 < 0.5  there 
is a situation of “over-crowding” (see e.g., Edwards, 1990) such that the decline in public 
services is faster than the increase in growth. The extreme case is generated when 𝜂 =0, 
(the smallest value according to the constraints assumed) where 𝛾 → −∞. 
  
The public capital efficiency strictly depends to the value assigned to 𝜂. In general we 
have that 
𝜕𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑
𝜕𝜂
> 0 implying that: 
 For 𝜂 = 1, congestions effects are neglected, therefore 
𝜕𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑
𝜕𝑌
= 0;  
 For 𝜂 < 1we have that 
𝜕𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑
𝜕𝑌
< 0 
 For  𝜂 → 0, the implication are such that 𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑 → 0 
                                                          
7 See e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994, 1997), Judd (1999) for alternative congestion modelling approaches in 
the context of growth models. 
8 This corresponds to the case described in Fisher and Turnovsky, (1998) called proportional congestion. 
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Typically, we would expect that for a positive exogenous shock, 𝐼𝑟
𝐺 > 0, and assuming no 
offsetting mechanism (manna from heaven), the elasticity of public capital determines 
the nature of the shock and the return to scale of the production function (14), therefore:  
 
 For  𝜉 = 0, production function (14) exhibits constant return to scale therefore the 
investment expenditure has the effect of a simple increase in current 
consumption, that is while 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐼
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐾(𝑔)
= 0. 
 For 𝜉 > 0, increasing return are in operation in the model hence conventional 
supply-side effects are in place. 
 
2.9 Commodity balance and closing the system 
The total absorption equation provides equilibrium in the commodity market: 
𝑋𝑟′,𝑖 = ∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑖𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
𝑗
+ 𝑁𝑟,𝑖𝑐𝑟,𝑖 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑆 + 𝐺𝑟,𝑗 + 𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑔𝑆
 (38)  
As for the capital market, capital demand equals the capital stock: 
𝑁𝑟,𝑗𝐾𝐷𝑟,𝑗 = 𝐾𝑟,𝑗
𝑃  (39)  
 
The labour market is equilibrated: 
 
∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑗𝑙𝑑𝑟,𝑗,𝑒
𝑗
= (1 − 𝑢𝑟,𝑒)𝐿𝑟,𝑒 (40)  
 
where,  
 
𝐿𝑟,𝑒 = ?̅?𝑟,𝑒 (41)  
 
By default, we consider the labour supply exogenous and no natural population change. 
Furthermore mobility of workers across regions is not permitted in the baseline model. 
Migration however can be turned as described in the section below, but even in this case 
migration acts retrospectively, with the current labour supply depending on past 
unemployment and wage differentials, and being exogenous from a contemporaneous 
perspective.  
 
The zero profit condition that link output price and average price determine the number 
of firms in the system for the f sectors: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑟,𝑓𝑃𝑟,𝑓
∗ 𝑁𝑟,𝑓 = ∑ 𝑁𝑟,𝑓𝑥𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓
𝑟′
𝑝𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓 − 𝑃𝑟,𝑓
∗ 𝑁𝑟,𝑓(𝑌𝑟,𝑓 + 𝑉𝑟,𝑓) (42)  
 
Furthermore the regional output should be equal to the overall goods and services traded 
domestically and outside the region: 
 
 
𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑖𝑍𝑟,𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑟,𝑠′,𝑖𝑝𝑟,𝑠′,𝑖
𝑠′
(1 + 𝜏𝑖,𝑟
𝑝 ) (43)  
 
 
Definition of Equilibrium. Given initial factors' endowment ?̅?𝑟,𝑒 , 𝐾𝑖,𝑟
𝑃 , 𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑠  the equilibrium 
of the economy is determined for each region r and each sector i, as a set of consumers' 
decision {C,S}, investors' decisions (𝐼𝑃), firms' decision {𝑍, 𝑌, 𝑉, 𝑣, 𝑁, 𝐾𝐷, 𝐿𝐷, 𝑙𝑑,𝑋,𝑥} that 
along with price formation {𝑃𝑐, 𝑃𝐼, 𝑃∗, 𝑃𝑧, 𝑃𝑦, 𝑃𝑖𝑛, 𝑃, 𝑝, 𝑟𝑘, 𝑊, 𝑤,𝑢𝑐𝑘}, all markets clear 
(goods and service market, labour and capital market, payment account), satisfy the low 
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of motion for public and private capital and the labour market conditions through the 
unemployment rates for each region and sectors. 
 
In its default configuration RHOMOLO ensures an unconstrained inflow of capital to 
sustain investment whenever required (this is a typical regional macroeconomic closure), 
not imposing any constraints on the balance of payments. Typically, no binding 
constraints are imposed to regional government balance. However, foreign savings from 
the Rest of the World in the model are passive, hence maintaining equilibrium in the 
payment accounts with the ROW.  
 
The high dimensionality of RHOMOLO in terms of regions and sectors imply that the 
number of (nonlinear) equations to be solved simultaneously is very large (in the order of 
the hundreds of thousands). Therefore, in order to keep the model manageable from a 
computation point of view, its dynamics are kept relatively simple. The model is solved in 
a recursively dynamic mode, where a sequence of static equilibria is linked to each other 
through the law of motion of state variables. This implies that economic agents are not 
forward-looking and their decisions are solely based on current and past information. 
 
 
Steady-State 
In the steady-state, T, we have that:  
𝛿𝑟𝐾𝑖,𝑟
𝑃 = 𝐼𝑟,𝑇
𝑃  (44)  
 
𝛿𝑟
𝑔𝐾(𝑔),𝑟,𝑇
𝑠 = 𝐼𝑟,𝑇
𝐺  (45)  
 
𝑚𝑟,𝑒,𝑇 = 0 (46)  
 
This implies that, by substituting Equation (44) into Equation (28) we have 𝑟𝑘𝑖,𝑟 , = 𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟, 
which implies that in steady-state ∆𝜑 = 0. 
 
 
3. Model's options 
3.1. Labour Market 
From equation (27) we have seen we can easily switch between a wage curve and 
Phillips curve modelling of the labour market by changing the related parameter of 
interest. However, the model could also be run assuming the more conventional 
neoclassical rule that implies perfect competition in the labour market. Assuming no 
changes in labour force a vertical labour supply applies to each period of the model. 
Therefore, the wage rate for each type of skill is determined endogenously and we drop 
Equation (27) and prevent adjustment in unemployment rate in Equation (40). The long-
run equilibrium obtained under full flexible wage is expected then to be the same as the 
long-run equilibrium generated under the Phillips curve. 
 
Furthermore the model can also account for wage rigidities by assuming fixed real or 
nominal wages. In this case we should drop Equation (27) fixing the wage (either the 
nominal or the real wage) allowing labour market adjustments through unemployment 
rate. 
 
3.2 Migration within the EU 
Labour force is fixed at the EU level. However, we can allow workers to migrate between 
regions. Workers' migration is governed by expected differences in the real incomes, and 
is also dependent to the probability to be employed in a given region as originally 
modelled in Persyn et al., 2014. The labour forces 𝐿𝑟,𝑒, in each region and for different 
type of skills, e, evolve according to the net migration rates (𝑚𝑟,𝑒) expressing incoming 
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minus outgoing workers, relative to the original size of the labour force, defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑚𝑟,𝑒 =
∑ 𝑠𝑟,′,𝑟,𝑒 𝐿𝑟,𝑒𝑟′ − ∑ 𝑠𝑟,𝑟′,𝑒 𝐿𝑟′,𝑒𝑟′
𝐿𝑟,𝑒
 (47)  
 
where 𝑠𝑟′,𝑟  is the share (or probability) of workers moving from region r' to r determined 
as (see Persyn et al., 2014): 
 
 
𝑠𝑟,𝑟′,𝑒 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(Ψ𝑟,𝑟′𝛽)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(Ψ𝑟,𝑟′𝛽)𝑠
 (48)  
 
where Ψ𝑟,𝑟′is a vector of characteristics of the regions such as, wages, unemployment 
and distance between regions while 𝛽 is the vector of coefficients related to these 
characteristics as estimated in Persyn et al. (2014). 
 
The labour supply thus evolves as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑟,𝑒,𝑡 = 𝐿𝑟,𝑒,𝑡−1(1 + 𝑚𝑟,𝑒) (49)  
 
 
3.3 Alternative mark-ups definitions 
In order to introduce any type mark-up modelling frameworks, firms’ pricing behaviour is 
generically characterised by a Lerner-type mark-up equation that relates equilibrium 
price-cost margins to the perceived elasticity of demand. In equation (24) the perceived 
elasticity 𝜀𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 is a function of the fixed elasticity of substitution 𝜎𝑟′,𝑗. This implies that the 
relative market power of region r in region r' is not transferred through changes in the 
prices in that region. This means that a region sells their goods and services to all the 
other regions at the same price. Alternative price settings such as Cournot or Bertrand 
oligopolistic competition can then be easily introduced by relating firms' market power 
(and hence mark-ups) to local market statistics. For example, under Cournot 
conjectures, the perceived elasticity is defined in equation (50): 
 
𝜀𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓 = 𝜎𝑟′,𝑓 + (Ω − 𝜎𝑟′,𝑓)𝑠𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓 (50)  
 
where Ω is the conjectural variation. For simplicity, we generally assume Ω = 1.  
 
Under Bertrand, the perceived elasticity is: 
𝜀𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 =
1
𝜎𝑟′,𝑓
− (
1
𝜎𝑟′,𝑗
− Ω) 𝑠𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓 
(51)  
With 
𝑠𝑟,𝑟′𝑓 =
𝑆𝑟,𝑟′,𝑓
𝑁𝑟,𝑓
 
𝑆𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 is the market share of region r on the market of region r'. 
 
Both oligopolistic competition frameworks share the intuition that firms with large market 
shares in local markets are aware of the impact of their pricing choices on the local price 
index and therefore find it optimal to charge a higher price than they would if their 
market share were negligible (and thus not affecting the local price index). 
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4. Data, calibration and elasticities 
4.1 Structural parameters and elasticity of substitutions 
The model calibration process assumes the regional economies to be initially in steady-
state equilibrium. This means that the capital stock is calibrated to allow depreciation to 
be fully covered by investments. All shift and share parameters are calibrated to 
reproduce the base year (2013) data in the EU interregional SAM derived from Thissen et 
al.,, 2018. In this work Supply and Use Tables at country level have been regionalized 
through a commodity balance approach while trade data are estimated using freight 
transport data. The number of firms in each region and sector are derived from the 
European Structural Business Statistics (Eurostat, 2017) while fixed costs are computed 
using the equilibrium condition in Equation (42) and subsequently added to production.9 
 
For illustrative purposes, regional average and associated standard deviation of selected 
calibrated share parameters are reported in Table 2.10 The structural and behavioural 
parameters of RHOMOLO are either borrowed from the literature or estimated 
econometrically. These are summarized in Table 3 and discussed further in this Section.  
 
The interest rate faced by producers, consumers and investors is set to 0.04, the rate of 
depreciation for private capital is set to 0.15, while that of public capital equates to 0.05 
(Kamps, 2006 and Gupta (2014). The risk premium is a calibrated parameter and 
determined as a residual from equation (31).  
 
The parameters related to the elasticities of substitution both on the consumer and on 
the producer sides are based on similar models or derived from the econometric 
literature. Typically, we assume a rather low elasticity of substitution in production and 
consumption, and a fairly high for trade between regions.  
 
Table 2.Selected calibrated shares in RHOMOLO 
 
 
Average  
across  
regions 
Standard 
deviation 
Wage rate 34.35 17.67 
Export total/GDP 0.78 0.79 
Export to ROW/GDP 0.15 0.17 
Import total/GDP 0.82 0.25 
Import from ROW/GDP 0.11 0.09 
Labour income shares 0.58 0.10 
Share value added in total production 0.39 0.08 
Investment/GDP 0.19 0.07 
Consumption/GDP 0.83 0.17 
Iceberg Transport Costs (average) 0.33 0.23 
 
 
                                                          
9 The relationships between number of firms and value added for each of the imperfectly competitive sectors 
are plotted in Annex II, Figure A1. 
10 In the Annex the reader can find the trade relationships integrated in the model. In Figure A2 we compare 
the share of total import (vertical axes) with the share of total export (horizontal axes). While in Figure 3A 
import and export shares are plotted only for international trade (ROW). We observe high positive correlation 
between import and export when international trade are considered whilst slightly less correlated results in the 
overall trade. 
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Table 3. Elasticity parameters in RHOMOLO 
 
𝜎𝑐 0.3 
𝜎𝑥 0.3 
𝜎𝑦 0.4 
𝜎𝑣 0.2 
𝜉 0.1 
𝜎𝑗 4 
𝛼 0 (default case) or 0.1 under dynamic adjustment over wage 
bargaining 
𝛽 0.1 
ς 0 (default case) or  0.25 under dynamic adjustment over wage 
bargaining 
𝜃 0 (default case) or 0.03 under dynamic adjustment over wage 
bargaining 
𝑣 1 
𝜂 0.5 
𝑖𝑟 0.15 (annual interest rate) 
𝛿𝑟 0.15 
𝛿𝑟
𝑔
 0.05 
 
As for the capital-labour substitution elasticity, the literature provides a wide range of 
estimates. However, there is a strong evidence in support of elasticity lower than 1.11 
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour has been found significantly 
lower than 1 in Krussel et al., 2000. In a recent study, Koesler and Schymura (2015), 
using the World-Input–Output Database found capital labour substitution elasticities 
significantly lower than one, averaging around 0.13. Okagawa and Ban (2008), van der 
Werf (2008) and Kemfert (1998) similarly estimate this elasticity to be in the 
neighbourhood of 0.5. Chirinko (2008) provides an exhausting summary of the empirical 
literature concluding that evidence suggest this elasticity in between 0.4 – 0.6. Finally, 
Chirinko et al., (2011) estimated an elasticity of 0.40 using a panel of 160 firms while in 
Leon Ledesma et al., (2011) the elasticity takes the value of around 0.5. In light of this 
empirical evidence we fairly set this elasticity equal to 0.4. 
 
We set the elasticity between labour types to 1.5. Justification for this value came from 
evidence in the empirical literature. For instance Katz and Murphy (1992), found point 
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour of 1.4 
while Krussel et al. (2000), Heckman et al. (1998) and Ciccone and Peri (2005) found 
estimates in the neighbour of 1.6. In Leon Ledesma et al (2011), high substitutability 
between skill types has been found. 
 
Existing studies on the estimation of Armington trade elasticities provide results mainly 
for the US and very few for Europe. In general, these analyses display substantial 
variations. They diverge for the level of aggregation, the estimation techniques or 
whether time series or cross-sectional data are used.12  Our default Armington elasticity 
is set equal to 4. This value finds justification from econometric estimates obtained using 
European dataset derived from the work of Németh et al., (2011), Olekseyuk and 
Schürenberg-Frosch (2016)  and Aspalter (2016) where elasticities range from around 2 
to 5, in the interval of 3 - 4.2 and 0.3 – 3.7, respectively. These elasticities appear to be 
consistent with other studies where single European countries are considered (Welsch, 
2008,  Imbs and Méjean, 2015 and 2010). However elasticities might be different across 
industries and across countries. Variation between 'micro-elasticities' and 'macro 
elasticities' could be significant (typically the former lower than the latter). This is for 
                                                          
11 See Acemoglu (2003). 
12 For a survey on US Armington elasticities see McDaniel  and Balistreri (2003). 
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example the case of the US (Feenstra et al., 2014 and  Imbs and Mejean, 2015) and to a 
less extent in Europe as shown  in Aspalter (2016); therefore sensitivity analysis around 
the trade  elasticities is of utmost importance to deliver a range of results to policy 
makers that are not bias in one direction.  
 
As for the wage curve parameterization, we typically run a long-run wage curve 
assuming 𝛽=0.113 (Nikjamp and Poot, 2005). However, if dynamics over the wage is 
introduced 𝛼, ς and θ are different than zero. In this case, we set 𝛼 = 0.1 where recent 
econometric evidence has shown value of α significantly less than 1 (Montuenga-Gómez, 
and Ramos-Parreño, 2005). However the debate is still open and the issue currently 
remain controversial. For all regions the default value of ς is set to 0.25 and θ=0.03. 
These values are derived from the study of Nymoen and Rødseth, 2003. 
 
 
The speed of adjustment in the model it is captured by the elasticity of the cost of 
capital 𝜌.  In our default simulations this parameter takes the value of 1 as in Uzawa 
(1969). Estimates of the speed of convergence or adjustment are not easy to find in the 
literature. The dynamic response of the model to policy shocks might depends on the 
specific nature of the policy simulated, the market at which the policy is targeted and the 
number of agents (large or small) the policy is addressed (Caballero and Engel, 2003). 
Estimates of the elasticity of the capital costs can thus vary widely; for instance in 
Caballero et al (1995), it can take the value in the range 0.01-2 while in the study of 
Caballero and Engel (2003) is in the range of 0.2-2.5. 
 
In our default configuration, typically public investment is exogenous, and the public 
capital stock is treated as an unpaid factor of production subject to congestion, where
50. . In other CGE models, as for example in Alonso-Carrera et al, (2009), the 
congestion parameter is set equal to 0.36 while three levels of congestion parameter 
(high, medium and low) are analysed in Seung and Kraybill (2001). Since we do not have 
specifically estimated parameters, in these circumstances we take the intermediate 
situation of proportional congestion ( 50. ) as a benchmark. However, we normally 
handle the uncertainty associated with the value of this parameter performing 
appropriate sensitivity analysis. 
 
Finally, the parameters related to the interregional labour migration are estimated in a 
panel data setting for each country separately  and can be found in Brandsma et al., 
2014 and  Persyn et al., 2014. 
 
4.2 Construction of the Transport Cost Matrix 
As mentioned before, Persyn et al., (2018) estimate a novel database of road transport 
costs for the EU regions at the NUTS2 level. The costs are estimated as the population-
weighted average costs of road transport between pairs of cities within the 267 regions. 
These costs correspond to the generalized transport costs (GTC) in euros, capturing the 
distance and time-related costs of the optimal route between each pair of regions for a 
representative truck. For distance-related costs, they consider fuel prices and fuel 
consumption, tolls, taxes and maintenance costs. For the time-related costs, they focus 
on salaries in the transport sector, maximum national speeds and European transport 
regulations on resting times. Additionally, actual geography is controlled by the use of a 
European digital elevation map that modifies the fuel consumption, speed and travel 
times according to the gradients of each road-segment. Any change in the components of 
                                                          
13 Most of the studies on the relationship between unemployment and wages find an elasticity close to -0.1 as 
summarized  by the meta-analysis carried out by Nikjamp and Poot (2005). This confirms the original stiedis of 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994, 1995). 
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this composite indicator converts into changes in transport costs that can be directly 
implemented in the RHOMOLO model. 
 
For use in the model, the generalized transport costs between origin-destination pairs are 
translated into a matrix of iceberg transport costs using the trade flows database from 
Thissen et al., (2018), in combination with information on the average load of trucks 
from the European Road Freight Transport survey (Eurostat, 2017a). As result,  bilateral 
positive and asymmetric transport-costs are obtained between all regions (i.e. 𝜏𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 ≠
 𝜏𝑟′,𝑟,𝑗).  
 
Figure 2. Average Generalized Transport Cost for each EU region. Euros. 
 
 
Figure 2 represents the average GTC, i.e. the transport cost (in euros), from each region 
to all the others. Core central regions (blue) face the lowest transport costs due to their 
close proximity and accessibility to other regions, which reduces their fuel consumption 
and time-related costs such as driver wages. By contrast, peripheral regions (red) in 
Southern Europe suffer from higher transport cost, whereas Nordic regions face high 
transport costs due to their remoteness, combined with high salaries in the transport 
sector. 
 
Finally, Persyn et al., (2018) create a transport policy tool to assess the impact of 
transport infrastructure investment on transport costs due to upgrading roads from 
primary and secondary roads to highways. Roads are selected through a ranking of 
candidate roads for upgrading using a cost-benefit analysis, taking into account the 
aggregate road use, and using country-level information on construction costs, adjusted 
for terrain. With the upgrading, transport costs are affected, and a new set of optimal 
routes is calculated and a new transport-costs matrix is obtained.  
 
The new modelling of the road network and transport costs introduces important features 
into RHOMOLO, because (1) it allows to capture the real geography of the EU regions; 
(2) it allows for transport costs shocks accounting for network effects; and (3) given the 
important amount of cohesion and regional funds directly invested into upgrading roads, 
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the transport policy tool allows to transform investments in infrastructure into changes in 
transport costs that can be easily incorporated into RHOMOLO. Since it has been 
recognized that transportation costs and differences in the relative accessibility of regions 
drives the location of economic agents to spatially dispersed economic outcomes (Di 
Comite et al., 2018; Bosker and Garretsen, 2010), the new transport-costs module of 
RHOMOLO represents an essential tool for policy analysis. 
 
4.3 Construction of the capital Matrix KM 
The capital 𝐾𝑀𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 appearing in equation (35) has been estimated by means of a Doubly 
Constrained Minimum Information (MI) model (Schneider and Zenios, 1990).  
Let 𝑇𝑟 = ∑ 𝐼𝑟,𝑗
𝑃 = ∑ 𝐼𝑟,𝑗
𝑃
𝑖𝑗  denote total Investment by regions r. Considering 𝑡𝐼,𝐽 the model 
estimated probabilities that any investors in region r, receive from j and pay to i where 
i= j  and some prior probabilities 𝑡?̅?,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗𝑖,𝑗
  derived from technical coefficients as 
appeared in equation (15) , the model can thus be formalized as follow : 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛   ∑ ∑ 𝑡𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
𝑗𝑖
[𝑙𝑛 (
𝑡𝑟,𝑖,𝑗
𝑡?̅?,𝑖,𝑗
) − 1] 
(52)  
subject to 
∑ 𝑡𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐼𝑟,𝑖
𝑆
𝑇𝑟
𝑖
;   ∑ 𝑡𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐼𝑟,𝑗
𝑃
𝑇𝑟
𝑗
; 
(53)  
 
0 ≤ 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 1 (54)  
where T,  𝑡?̅?,𝑖,𝑗, 𝐼𝑟,𝑖
𝑆  and 𝐼𝑟,𝑗
𝑃  are fixed. Therefore 𝐾𝑀𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑡𝑖,𝑗𝑇𝑟
𝐼𝑟,𝑗
𝑃 . 
 
5. Discussion on the assumptions  
 
RHOMOLO models the behaviour and the adjustments taking place in-and-among 
regions. Therefore, RHOMOLO simulations aim to capture and measure the relationships 
taking place between regional economies through factors mobility and trade of goods and 
services. As compared to country modelling, the regional dimension of the model 
requires an additional effort when attempting to identify the main mechanism operating 
in the market. Regions do not have the full range of macroeconomic policy levers 
typically associated with countries. For instance, monetary and fiscal policy are under the 
control of national Government or superior authority (EU) so that policy tools and some 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms, whose incorporation can be considered 
undisputed in national models, cannot regularly be applied to the case of a region.  
 
Typically regional economies are more open than their national counterparts.14 
Furthermore, EU regions share the same market of goods, labour and capital, implying 
faster and easier economic adjustments. This means for instance that any price and 
income changes occurring in one region can be transmitted very effectively throughout 
the economic system, thereby inducing economic agents to adjust their market 
behaviour, e.g. demanding more imported goods or moving assets to other regions. 
                                                          
14 By construction, the sum of the regions of a country are at least as open as the country itself (being at 
exactly the same level of openness only in the unlikely case of zero inter-regional trade within the country). 
Notice also the scale dimension of the issue: whereas every individual household is fully open (in the sense that 
is the imports and exports to other households the totality of its economic transactions), the world as a whole is 
a closed economy. Hence, there is normally a connection between the territorial scale of the analysis and the 
expected level of openness of the economies analysed. 
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Unlike national economies, it is unlikely regions will face binding balance of payments 
constraints. 
 
The balance-of-payment adjustment operating in RHOMOLO is such that any current 
account imbalances are directly offset by changes in the capital account. We do this to 
reflect the high degree of openness observed in regional economic systems. Particularly 
in our case, regions belonging to the EU and especially those belonging to the common 
currency area operate in a fully integrated market and a unified banking system. This 
means that changes in foreign exchange reserves are not possible. This implies that, for 
any loss in competitiveness, price and income adjustment musts take place in order to 
produce the corresponding changes in capital accounts required to offset the deficits in 
the current account because regions cannot directly use fiscal and monetary policy to 
offset negative payment restrictions generated by income deflation. 
 
We do not explicitly include money as a commodity in the model, so we do not need to 
explicitly impose money market equilibrium (for example allowing money supply to 
adjust endogenously to money demand). In these circumstances, equilibrium in 
commodity market (Equation (38)) is sufficient to guarantee the equilibrium also in the 
payments account. The lack of explicit treatment of money is a clear limitation of the 
model. In particular, the absence of a banking system module prevents us to capture the 
interaction of agents and financial intermediaries. This also means that agents could 
borrow or lend without facing an endogenous credit risk. However the model is able to 
capture any change in the market risk premium exogenously. The market risk premium 
parameter is calibrated in the model as the difference between the market return and the 
risk free rate (interest rate plus depreciation).  
 
In RHOMOLO, investment and saving decisions are kept separated and in contrast to 
standard applications in our formulation savings follow the Solow-Swan assumption, 
keeping the rate of savings exogenous. Naturally, this does not prevent the absolute 
level of savings from varying over time. Investments are determined independently of 
savings with a separate investment function (Uzawa, 1969) to reflect the Keynesian 
intuition that investments varies according to profitability. The incorporation of these 
closures seems consistent with the adjustment that would occur in a regional economy. 
Regions are small open economies and it appears unlikely that regional households react 
passively to sustain the financial need of the regional system as in the case where 
households' savings is wholly determined by imposing balance of payment constraints.  
 
The configuration of the labour market is of utmost importance for the sign and 
magnitude of results of the simulation. There is still no clear consensus in the economic 
literature on the particular form of microeconomic real wage dynamics. While 
Blanchflower and Oswald's estimates (1994, 1995, 2005) argue in favour of a Wage 
Curve specification, showing little autoregression in real wages, Blanchard and Katz 
(1997) provide evidence in support of a Phillips Curve, rather than a Wage Curve when 
United States data are used. Still for the US, Staiger, et al., (2002) and Card and Hyslop 
(1997) also report a high level of auto-regression in U.S. wages, suggesting support for a 
Phillips curve.  
 
While the existence of a wage setting curve in United States data has been viewed as 
more controversial, a number of studies for the EU apparently probe the robustness for a 
wage curve. For instance Nijkamp and Poot (2005) in their meta-analysis on a sample of 
around 200 wage curve elasticities conclude that the Wage Curve is empirically robust. 
Moreover, for some north European countries, such as Norway, Denmark and UK, the 
autoregression coefficient is greater than zero but significantly lower than 1 and around 
0.5 as reported in Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño (2005). Therefore, we cannot 
consider this evidence strongly supporting a Phillips curve adjustment. Rather as 
suggested by Montuenga-Gómez and Ramos-Parreño, 2005, these estimates are 
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favourable to a type of wage setting curve with low adjustment towards a new 
equilibrium. 
  
Although the lack of clear consensus in the economic literature, it seems that empirical 
evidence for the EU economies argues in favour of a wage setting curve. In these 
circumstances we opted for a long-run wage curve, as default labour market closure 
operating in RHOMOLO. However, as seen in Section 3.1, alternative wage settings are 
incorporated in the model. We can run the model under fixed nominal or real wages to 
reflect wage rigidities. In addition, there is an option for running the model under a 
traditional Phillips curve. We believe that the flexibility to switch between labour market 
closures make us in the position to offer policy makers in general and our partner DGs in 
particular, a range of potential impacts associated to specific policies, in consideration of 
the uncertainty related to the real operational mechanism governing the EU labour 
market. Furthermore, by performing an additional set of counterfactuals based on 
different labour market closures one can better disentangle the main mechanisms and 
drivers in operation in the model.  
 
In particular, comparisons of outcomes derived from the Wage Curve and the Phillips 
Curve are of extreme importance to assess two distinctive economic concepts. The wage 
curve reflects a non-competitive environment where unemployment not only acts as 
"discipline device" but also as a market clearing mechanism. In contrast, the Phillips 
Curve represents the necessary adjustments process of wage inflations towards a 
competitive equilibrium. This means that the macroeconomic impact associated with the 
two specifications can be dramatically different especially in the long-run. However in our 
baseline simulations, we attempt to embrace the two concepts parameterizing 
appropriately (using recent econometric evidence) the wage equation (Eq. 27) as 
discussed in Section 4. 
 
As for the assumptions made on the product market structure, in the economic literature 
there is still no clear consensus on the realistic form of competition modellers are 
required to use. In the default configuration of RHOMOLO a selected number of sectors 
are modelled according to monopolistic competition a la Dixit-Stiglitz. The implications 
are such that the same selling price for a given industry applies to all destination 
countries since the mark-up does not dependent from the market shares. A single 
industry of a given region sell products to all the other regions at the same fob (first-on-
board) price, even if consumers in the importing regions can observe different cif (Cost, 
Insurance and Freight) prices, including iceberg transport costs. 
 
Running the model under monopolistic competition allows us to simplify the analysis and 
provide an easy interpretation of the results. However RHOMOLO, as seen in Section 3.3, 
does incorporate alternative market structures, which allow us to perform additional 
counterfactual analysis to measure the potential changes one will encounter assuming a 
different competitive frameworks. Naturally given that the market shares for individual 
varieties are small, the resulting quantitative effects that one can obtain from the 
incorporation of different market structures is expected to be negligible though 
technically elegant.  
 
 
6. Experiments and analysis 
6.1. Simulation strategy 
We perform a simple experiment to show the main regional economic adjustments 
associated to a positive demand shock. Essentially, we focus on the capacity of each 
individual region to contribute to the overall EU economy through trade spillovers by 
simulating a permanent increase in final demand, namely government expenditure, of 
€10M in each of the 10 economic sectors, separately implemented for each of the 267 
EU-NUTS2 regions incorporated in the RHOMOLO model. The experiment thus implies a 
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total permanent monetary injection of €100M per year in each regional economy. This 
section provides a comparative static analysis where the initial steady-state equilibrium is 
compared with a post-shock long-run steady-state economy. The investigation of the 
long-run equilibra achieved after the process of full adjustment to the initial disturbance 
helps to maintain the analysis simple and it is expected to make the reader in the 
condition to better understand the underlying theory behind the model.To keep the 
analysis as simple as possible, we deliberately neglect any adverse supply-side effects 
that would arise from endogenous offsetting effects as we would have under a balanced 
budget framework. This means that we avoid binding constraints on equation (8). Yet, 
the nature of the government spending is such that any increase in consumption does 
not affect public physical assets, that is to say it will only increase demand for final goods 
and services, again ignoring direct supply-side implications. Furthermore, to prevent 
output changes to affect the effective public capital stock, we set 𝜉 = 0. 
Since price changes drive the sign and the magnitude of the impacts within each region 
and in the Rest of the EU (REU), it is interesting to differentiate and to analyse the 
corresponding outcomes under different labour market closures by running the same 
shocks for a number of alternative wage settings. Indeed, the choice of labour market 
assumptions may result in widely different outcomes. The wage response could be fully 
incorporated into commodity prices, in turn affecting competitiveness and trade patterns. 
We compare three labour market assumptions that correspond to the alternative labour 
market closures incorporated in the model: fixed real wage, wage curve and Phillips 
curve. The idea here is to gradually increase upward pressure on wages and measure the 
likely effects of alternative labour market assumptions directly on the perturbed and non-
perturbed economies. We are also interested to analyse the extent to which wage 
pressure in the perturbed regions are passed onto other regions. That is, the degree at 
which, competitiveness effects in one region generate economic benefits or losses to 
other regions through changes in trade patterns. 
Under the fixed real wage assumption, we attempt to mimic the behaviour of a fixed-
price model such as a conventional Leontief model. We would expect an adjustment path 
that would bring prices back to their initial steady-state level.15 This means that, in the 
absence of price changes, in the long-run the magnitude of the impact and the 
transmission of the effects from the perturbed regions to the others will solely (or 
mostly) depend on the initial calibrated shift and share parameters of the model.  
When we move to the other labour market assumptions, endogenous wage effects should 
generate upward pressure on prices. In the long-run, it is likely to observe higher wage 
pressure under Phillips curve wage behaviour because increased demand for labour 
resulting from a surge in demand of final goods and services has to be fully offset by a 
rise in wages. 
Under labour market assumptions that permit upward wage pressure we would expect, 
following an initial disturbance, an alteration of the initial domestic and trade backward 
linkages. To have an idea of the backward linkages initially governing our steady-state 
economy, in Figure 3 we plot the domestic backward linkages (x-axis) and trade 
backward linkages (y-axis) derived from a Type I Leontief multiplier (Miller and Blair, 
2009). The red lines identify the computed average domestic and trade backward 
linkages that divide the quadrant in 4. On the top right quadrant we have regions that 
generate greater internal multiplier and at the same time generate high spillover at the 
benefit of the rest of EU. On the contrary the bottom-left quadrant identifies regions that 
not only provide little spillover to the other regions but also generate lower multipliers in 
their own domestic economy.  Under the wage curve and Phillips curve wage setting we 
expect this initial situation to be altered. However under fixed real wage, if prices remain 
                                                          
15 The system behaves almost as an IO model (see e.g., Gilmartin et al., 2013). In reality prices are not exactly 
converging to pre-shock levels since nominal wages adjusts to offset changes in CPI.  
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fixed in the long-run (or close to pre-shock levels), no changes in the relative 
composition of the external and internal backward linkages are expected to happen.  
 
Figure 3. Calibrated domestic and trade backward linkages 
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paths for selected regional economies. In the first instance, we run the model assuming 
all product markets perfectly competitive. However in the proceeding of the paper we run 
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imperfectly competitive markets thus comparing each of the market structure's options 
integrated in the RHOMOLO model: monopolistic competition, Cournout and Bertrand 
market structures. The purpose of using this setup is to show how a permanent demand 
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to which the initial incorporated varieties in the model are influenced by alternative wage 
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6.2. Analysis of the results under perfect competition 
 
The impact on the perturbed regions 
To compare the outcomes of the model obtained for each of the 267 regions under the 
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quintiles16 and the resulting outcome is a variegate pattern, with darker shading 
highlighting regions with greater GDP multiplier effects. Under fixed real wages the 
internal multiplier effects seem more regularly distributed compared to the other two 
cases. Furthermore, we observed that for all wage structures Easter European regions 
generate larger multiplier effects while lower multiplier effects are generally associated to 
central European regions. Maps' inspection also suggest that regions registering higher 
multiplier effects under one regional wage setting do not necessarily generate greater 
multiplier effects under other wage setting structures. For instance, regions in England 
and South of Italy report larger multiplier effects (darker shading) with a Phillips curve 
and a wage curve but not under fixed real wages.  
 
It is thus noticeable that the three set of results differ not only in the magnitude of the 
impact experienced by each region, but also and more importantly in the geographical 
pattern that might change according to the labour market assumptions used in the 
simulations. To reinforce this finding and to test whether the outcome obtained under the 
three different wage structures are correlated with each other, in Figure 5 we plot 
absolute long-run GDP changes for each region compared across specifications of labour 
market modelling. The absolute changes in real GDP obtained in each of the 267 
perturbed regions under the fixed real wage and the wage curve are plotted in panel (a), 
while panel (b) compares absolute changes in real GDP under fixed real wage and the 
Phillips curve, and finally in panel (c) the scatterplot illustrates the relation between 
regional outcomes associated with wage curve and the Phillips curve assumptions. The 
correlation between the results obtained under the wage curve and Phillips curve is 
around 0.8 whilst the correlation between the results obtained under fixed real wage and 
wage curve on the one hand and fixed real wage and Phillips curve on the other hand is 
around 0.5 in both cases.  
 
Figure 4. The regional economic impact of simulating 100 M increase in government 
expenditure. Simulations perform separately for each individual region under three 
labour market assumptions. Value in million euro  
(a) Fixed Real 
 
                                                          
16 In the maps reported in Figure 4 we are not using the same scale for each of the wage configurations. 
Quintile groups are thus defined on the GDP changes obtained specifically under each of the labour market 
closures. Application of the same quintiles for each of the three simulations would result in illegible maps given 
that the magnitude of the impact differs significantly among labour market closures.    
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Figure 4 continue 
 
(b) Wage curve 
 
 
 
(c) Phillips Curve 
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Figure 5. Co-movements between internal multiplier under three labour market assumptions 
 
a)           Fixed real wage – Wage curve    b)        Fixed real wage – Phillips curve          c)      Wage curve – Phillips 
curve 
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Figure 6. The relationships between exports and real wages under wage curve and 
Phillips curve 
 
a) Wage curve 
 
b) Phillips curve
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The strong co-movement of the output generated under the wage curve and Phillips 
curve could be explained by the fact that in both cases there is an upward pressure on 
real wages as a consequence of an augmented aggregate demand that in turn causes an 
increase in labour demand. More specifically under the Phillips curve, the long-run rise in 
labour demand is fully counteracted by an increase in wages which is required to 
maintain a vertical labour supply curve at the natural rate of unemployment. By contrast, 
under the wage curve, the excess demand for labour is cleared through adjustments in 
unemployment rates that in turn act as 'discipline device' (or as a measure of bargaining 
power of workers). In our experiments, unemployment rates fall, placing workers in the 
position to claim and obtain a rise in real wages. In both cases upward pressure on 
wages results in an increase in commodity prices that generate a fall in competitiveness 
and in turn a reduction in exports particularly exports to the ROW. The strong co-
movement between exports and real wages can be seen in Figure 6 where the exports-
real wages relationships are plotted for the case of wage curve (top panel) and Phillips 
curve (bottom panel). In the perturbed economy loss in competitiveness, however, only 
partially offset the positive effect of an increase in demand therefore the ultimate effect 
in both wage configurations is an increase in real GDP. As we will discuss later in this 
section, by lowering the trade elasticity, the negative term of trade effects that provide 
adverse competitiveness effects will be moderated generating in turn bigger multiplier 
effects. 
 
For the case of fixed real wages, and specifically for the example considered in this 
paper, where supply-side effects of an expansion in government expenditure are 
intentionally neglected, the long-run equilibria derived from the model attempt to 
emulate a conventional Input-Output model where infinite supply of factors (see e.g., 
McGregor et al., 1996 and Gilmartin et al., 2013) and fixed prices are applied. 
Essentially, with fixed real wages the upward pressure on commodity prices in the long-
run is significantly reduced and of no importance. With no changes in real wages, 
changes in prices are constrained to be small and not enough to cause adverse 
competitiveness effects.17 It is therefore likely to expect larger regional multiplier effects 
under fixed real wages. 
 
 
Table 4. The GDP multiplier effects under three alternative labour market 
closures 
    Regions   EU 
 
   PC WC FRW   PC  WC FRW 
Average Multiplier 0.14 0.34 0.93 -0.10 0.10 3.04 
  (0.06) (0.13) (0.38) (0.39) (0.62) (0.77) 
Standard deviation in brackets. PC: Phillips curve. WC: Wage curve. FRW: Fixed real wages. Source: Author's 
simulations 
 
As a results of different competitiveness effects associated to the three labour market 
options, the expected economic impact in the perturbed regions and the propagation of 
the spillovers when transmitting the shock from the perturbed regions to the non-
perturbed regions vary according to the to the degree of wage pressure considered. In 
Table 4, we report the long-run average multiplier effects calculated over 267 simulated 
multipliers18 obtained in each region perturbed and the corresponding average multiplier 
                                                          
17 Under fixed real wage, the nominal wage might change in response to changes in the regional consumer 
price index (CPI). Furthermore, all the excess demand of labour is absorbed raising labour market participation. 
18 The multiplier effect is calculated in each region dividing the absolute changes in GDP obtained in the 
perturbed region to the changes in government expenditures. The EU multiplier is calculated dividing the 
absolute GDP changes for the whole EU obtained by simulating each region divided by the change in 
government expenditure.  
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obtained for the overall EU economy as a result of a single regional perturbation. Results 
for the three labour market modelling assumptions are also reported.  
 
As expected at the individual regional level, larger upward pressure on wages reduces 
the economic impact on the perturbed regions. We observe the highest impact under 
fixed real wages (0.93) while the lowest impact is recorded under the Phillips curve 
(0.14). Greater regional variation is observed under fixed real wages where the standard 
deviation for the regional multiplier effects is higher (0.38). The lowest standard 
deviation is recorded under the Phillips curve wage assumption (0.06) suggesting that 
under this labour market closure each single regional economy is by and large generating 
a similar internal multiplier effect (or at least close to the average). 
 
For each of the wage configurations it is helpful to investigate the role played by the 
calibrated shares parameters. Intuitively we would expect that the capacity to generate 
higher multiplier effects within a region is contingent upon its import intensity. If a region 
satisfies the increased demand for goods and services through higher imports, the 
resulting impact is likely to be lower than the case in which excess demand are met 
through internal production. In Figure 7, we evaluate the model's ability to match these 
facts by showing the correlation between the simulated absolute GDP changes and the 
log of the share of import/GDP ratio as in the initial steady-state for each of the wage 
structures: fixed real wage (panel a), wage curve (panel b), Phillips Curve (panel c). 
There is a strong negative correlation under fixed real wage whilst for the remaining 
wage setting alternatives the correlation is lower, though still negative as expected. 
Under fixed real wages, the steady-state economy does not suffer from significant price 
pressure and therefore the economic impact mainly depends on the initial (pre-shock) 
ability to meet augmented demand using internal production. In other words, the initial 
backward linkages play a great role in determining the economic impact associated to an 
external disturbance. As said above under fixed real wage assumption the RHOMOLO 
model operates as an extended standard I-O-based demand-driven model where all the 
elements of final demands (e.g., investment and consumption) are endogenous (see 
e.g., Lecca et al., 2015 and Swales 2005).  However, for the case of wage curve and 
Phillips curve, the change in price alters the initial economic structure making the 
regional economy less dependent from the calibrated share parameters. In these 
circumstances the indirect supply-side effects achieved through change in prices contrary 
to the case of the fixed real wage are able to modify the existing pre-shock backward 
linkages.  
 
Interregional spillover 
 
By and large, the spillovers generated by each region differ dramatically and so the 
capacity of a single regional economy to transmit the shock to the rest of non-perturbed 
regions is also subject to an extensive variation. Inspecting Table 4, we observe that the 
wage setting structure will also impact significantly the REU economies. In this table we 
report the multiplier effects for the all EU, however given that the shock performed in 
each region is the same, the average spillover (that is the impact on the REU economy as 
whole) can be easily calculated from the difference between the EU multiplier and the 
regional multipliers.  
 
Under fixed real wages and a wage curve we register a positive impact for the EU as a 
whole (the multipliers being 3.04 and 0.10 respectively) while the overall EU impact 
obtained under the Phillips curve is in average negative (-0.10). Only under the fixed real 
wage, the EU multiplier is significantly higher than the internal average multiplier 
observed in the regions (0.93) meaning that the impact on the REU is positive. Whilst for 
the remaining two labour market assumptions the resulting spillovers generate, on 
average, negative impact on economic activities for the REU. The reported standard 
deviation suggests that not all regions generate negative spillover for the REU. In 
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general, we have observed that a single region perturbation generates positive spillovers 
within the country they belong to, but ultimately the impact in the other REU regions is 
negative. Typically distance matter for backward spillovers but country boundaries seem 
more important in this cases19.   
 
The perverse effects in operation under upward wage pressure on the REU economy need 
to be analysed further. When a single region is perturbed, the demand for intermediate 
and final goods from the REU economies increases. Therefore, the overall REU economy 
will enjoy an increase in exports towards the perturbed regions and possibly towards the 
other remaining EU regions. However, the increase in demand for goods and services in 
the REU economy generates also an increase in wages that in turn cause commodity 
prices to rise and therefore generate negative terms of trade effects. Ultimately, loss in 
competitiveness especially with respect to the ROW will come into play. While loss in 
competitiveness in the perturbed regions are fully counteracted by the increase in 
internal production, in the REU economies (the non-perturbed regions) the fall in the 
exports to the ROW could fully offset the positive benefit of an increase in interregional 
exports. In addition, the rise in domestic prices makes the import of goods and services 
more expensive. This is what is happening for the wage curve and Phillips curve cases as 
shown in Table 4. The upward wage pressure registered under these two labour market 
closures is able to make in average the REU economy worst off. Under these two wage 
setting options an important role in determining the effectiveness of the channels of 
interregional spillover transmission is played by trade elasticities; lower values being 
associated with bigger multipliers within the region due to a higher resistance of regional 
consumers to trade-off locally produced goods for imported goods when the prices of the 
former rise.  
 
In order to test how sensitive our results can be to variations in trade elasticities, in 
Table 5, we report the EU average multipliers obtained lowering the substitution 
possibilities with the REU and the ROW. The default elasticity is set to 4 in both cases. 
We now implement the same simulations recalibrating the model with an elasticity of 
substitution of 2 in EU interregional trade while for the international trade (trade with the 
ROW) the elasticity is now set to 0.5. The GDP impact in the perturbed regions has 
increased significantly compared to the case where default elasticities apply. Furthermore 
the overall impact on the EU and the REU is now positive for all three wage structures 
considered. As anticipated above this is the result of lower substitution possibilities in 
trade that reduce the adverse competitiveness effects previously occurring in the REU 
economy. 
Table 5. The multiplier effect under three alternative labour market closures obtained 
with lower trade elasticity 
    Regions   EU 
 
   PC WC FRW   PC  WC FRW 
Average GDP Multiplier 0.35 0.56 0.93 2.49 2.26 3.04 
  (0.4) (0.25) (0.38) (2.09) (0.88) (0.77) 
Standard deviation in brackets. PC: Phillips curve. WC: Wage curve. FRW: Fixed real wages. Source: Author's 
simulations 
 
With lower trade elasticities the perturbed regions are faced with lower adverse 
competitiveness effects of an increase in wages resulting in a higher GDP impact. 
Similarly in the REU economies, the fall in exports to the ROW is now not able to 
                                                          
19 It is part of our future agenda to undertake further research to analysis the extent to which trade spillover 
are affected by distance.  
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counteract the benefit of an increase in demand of goods and services coming from the 
perturbed regions and the rest of other REU regions. Hence impact on GDP is positive for 
most of the non-perturbed regions. 
It is worth noticing that trade elasticity however plays no role under fixed real wage. For 
this wage configuration the results reported on Table 5 are the same reported in Table 4. 
In this case the change in prices expected in the long-run are negligible making changes 
in elasticity of substitutions of no importance. Hence with fixed prices the propagation of 
the shock towards the other EU regions will exclusively depends from the capacity to 
generate bigger internal output multipliers and from the initial propensity to import from 
the REU economies.  
In summary, there are two sets of stylized facts that deserve to be highlighted in the 
simulations. First, the propagation of the shock to other regions crucially depends on the 
wage regime adopted in the model. Clearly the labour market closure adopted in the 
model has to be as close as possible to that empirically observed in the region under 
scrutiny. In our analysis we show that under fixed real wage the magnitude of the 
spillovers is higher than in the alternative modelling options for two main reasons. The 
first, is that the internal multiplier generated in the perturbed regions is significantly 
greater than in the other wage specifications because the absence of upward wage 
pressure prevents the loss of competitiveness. The perturbed regions thus faces higher 
demand for goods and services from the REU. The second reason is that the spillovers 
are transmitted to the other regions without altering the initial geographical trade pattern 
because the initial import intensity is not affected significantly due to the long-run return 
of prices to their initial steady-state level. 
The second stylized fact is related to the importance of the choice of trade elasticity that 
in combination with the labour market channels could results in a widely different 
outcome. The real GDP changes for the non-perturbed regions under a wage curve and a 
Phillips Curve could be negative if the trade elasticity is high enough to cause adverse 
competitiveness effects. However, under fixed real wage the non-perturbed regions 
always benefit from an increase in demand occurring in another region. The extent of the 
trade spillover, that is the impact on the REU economies, in this case will necessary be 
influenced by the share of imports of goods and services from the REU by the perturbed 
region. This can be for example be seen in Figure 8, where for each of the wage 
structures assumed we plot the absolute GDP changes in the REU on the x-axis and the 
log of import from REU of each region as a share of GDP. Scatterplots suggests that only 
under fixed real wage we can envisage positive correlation between the two variables. 
However some sort of correlation is hard to be identified in the other two cases. 
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Figure 7. The relationships between the change in real GDP and the import intensity under the three labour market assumptions 
 
                (a) Fixed Real       (b) Wage curve      (c) Phillips Curve 
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Figure 8. The relationships between the absolute change in real GDP in the aggregate REU economy and the regional import intensity 
from REU under the three labour market assumptions 
 
(a) Fixed Real       (b) Wage curve      (c) Phillips Curve 
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6.3. Transition path 
Until this point, the analysis of the simulations has been focussed on the long-run 
equilibrium. In this section we discuss the transition path toward the new steady state as 
a result of the shock. We are primarily interested to present the differences in the 
qualitative adjustments observed under the three types of labour market structures. To 
facilitate the understanding of the model mechanisms at the regional level in Figure 9 we 
plot the percentage deviations from initial steady-state in real GDP, employment, 
investment, household consumption and CPI for one representative region – Île-de-
France (FR10, NUTS2), distinguishing between the results obtained under fixed real 
wages (top panel), wage curve (middle panel) and Phillips curve (bottom panel).  
 
As expected, for the entire transition path changes in real GDP are larger in the case of 
fixed real wages and lower when using the Phillips curve. The reader will notice that in 
the first period the simulated outcomes obtained under the Phillips curve and the Wage 
curve coincide. This is the result of myopic agents' expectations. However, as the 
economy adjusts, the results generated under these two distinctive labour market 
closures start to diverge. Under the Phillips curve the economy is required to return to a 
competitive equilibrium according to which the employment bounces back to its pre-
shock steady-state values in the long-run. This reflects the fact that in steady-state the 
unemployment rate is constrained to return to its initial steady-state level. A different 
mechanism is observed under the wage curve, where employment keeps raising until 
reaching a level of 0.004% above the baseline level. 
 
In all three cases, our simulations suggests that in the short-run employment is affected 
proportionally more than real GDP. This is substantially due to the supply-side 
constraints imposed in the first period, where capital stock is fixed to its base year value. 
However, in the long-run we observe a rather different situation. Under fixed real wages 
the change in employment and GDP equalized, meaning that capital is increasing at the 
same rate in this time frame. This is what we would expect under fixed real wages where 
prices will adjusts so as to go back to pre-shock level making therefore the capital-labour 
substitution effects in the long-run solely dominated by the initial values of calibrated 
shares. For the other two labour market assumptions, capital-labour substitution is 
sensitive to price changes and typically we observe that soon after the first period the 
changes in GDP is above the change in employment. Hence capital is increasing more 
than employment proportionally. Under a wage curve assumption, the economic 
expansion associated with the perturbation, increase labour demand making workers in 
the position to bargain for higher wages, hence encouraging substitution away from 
labour. Similarly under the Phillips curve substitution in favour of capital is more 
pronounced. Upward pressure on wages continues until the employment rate goes back 
to its original equilibrium generating expansion in economic activities gradually 
determined only by capital expansion. 
 
One final interesting observation is that under the wage curve and the Phillips curve 
labour market assumptions, the proportionate changes in consumption and investments 
are in the long-run higher than the changes in GDP. Since economic activities are 
increasing, there should be some offsetting effects preventing the GDP to rise more than 
its actual level.  
 
While negative competitiveness effects occur in all three cases, the larger loss in 
competitiveness is registered in the case of Phillips curve and the Wage-curve where 
prices are well above the base year values (this can be seen observing the CPI changes 
in Figure 9). Essentially a greater increase in internal demand is indeed required to offset 
the fall in net-exports, so as to sustain growth in these cases. Hence household 
consumption and investment have to increase more than the GDP in the long-run. 
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Figure 9. Impact of €100M increase in Government expenditures on selected economic 
variables in the – Île-de-France Region (FR10 NUTS2) 
b) Fixed real wage 
 
 
b) Wage curve 
 
 
c) Phillips curve 
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To reinforce our findings, Figure 10 displays changes in net exports for the three labour 
market structures under examination.  We observe that the fall in next export is similar 
across labour market closures in the short-run however the differences tend to expand as 
the economy grows. Since greater pressure on wages takes place under Phillips curve 
labour market it is in this wage setting that we observe a greater reduction in net export. 
 
Figure 10. Impact of 100M increase in Government expenditures on Net-Export in the – 
Île-de-France region (FR10 NUTS2) 
 
 
6.4. Analysis of the results under alternative product-market structures  
Until now the analysis has been performed assuming perfect competitive commodity 
markets. To gain further insights and to have comprehensive understanding of the 
regional economic consequences of a demand shock, we take advantage of the flexibility 
of our modelling framework by simulating, as in the previous experiment, a €100 M per 
year permanent increases in current government expenditures equally distributed in each 
of the 10 economic sectors using alternative formulations of imperfectly competitive 
commodity markets. In Section 4, we have seen that RHOMOLO is equipped to deal with 
three configurations of imperfectly competitive markets: monopolistic competition and 
oligopolistic competition à la Bertrand and à la Cournot. The main difference between the 
three types of market structures rests on the determination of the mark-up. Under 
standard monopolistic competition firms do not internalise their impact on the market-
wide price index and so the mark-up is fixed for all firms and depends only on trade 
elasticities. Given that trade elasticity is the same for each region-pair, the selling price 
set by firms is the same for the same variety sold in all the regions. By contrast, in the 
other two cases the mark-up not only depends on trade elasticity but also from the 
market shares of varieties of region r in region r'. The implications is that while under the 
simple case of monopolistic competition we assume integrated markets, under Cournot 
and Bertrand markets are segmented and prices differ across regions for the same 
variety of goods. 
 
In all three cases considered, the demand functions for an individual firm-specific variety 
produced in region r take the form of equation (21). Therefore the pure love-for-variety 
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incorporated in the model take the form of a simplified Armington–Dixit–Stiglitz model, 
where the demand nesting function collapses towards a single nest structure with a 
single constant elasticity of substitution between goods of all geographic origins, with the 
only difference with respect to the standard monopolistic competition case being the 
prices of the different varieties. 
 
A comparison of simulation results under the three different models is reported in Table 
6. For the sake of comparability we also report the results shown in the previous section, 
obtained under perfectly competitive product markets. Similarly to the analysis carried 
out in Section 6.2 we compute the average multiplier obtained in the perturbed regions 
under the three labour market assumptions. These results are reported on the left-side of 
Table 6. We also show the magnitude of the spillovers obtained shocking a single region 
by reporting the associated average multipliers for the EU as whole on the right-hand 
side of the same table.  
 
Our modelling experiment suggests that for a simple demand shock the magnitude of the 
macroeconomic effects generated in the perturbed regions under the three alternative 
imperfectly competitive market structures are similar. Under Phillips curve wage 
behaviour, the multiplier is around 0.13, under wage curve equates to 0.31, while under 
fixed real wage the multiplier is around 0.93-0.94. So the main stylized fact emerging 
from this analysis is that regardless of the pattern of adjustments that might occur under 
alternative mark-up specifications, in the long-run a demand shock does not generate 
dramatic differences among alternative configurations of market structures. This is due to 
the fact that we are adopting a basic Armington-Dixit-Stiglitz nesting structure that 
results in an application of a simple model of pricing and mark-ups where selling prices 
do not change radically to variation of the structure of imperfectly competitive models, 
even when Bertrand and Cournot types of competition are assumed. As observed for the 
perfectly competitive case, we obtain higher average multiplier under fixed real wages for 
the perturbed and the non-perturbed regions. The EU average multipliers under fixed real 
wages equate to 3.04, 3.08 and 3.24 for the monopolistic competition, Bertrand and 
Cournot market structures respectively.  
 
When comparing perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets we observe that the sign 
of the impact is qualitatively the same in all market structures considered. The size of the 
effects differs, but not substantially. Further inspecting Table 6 we can see that under 
imperfectly competitive market, the size of the multiplier for the whole EU tend to be 
larger under imperfectly competitive models, when the fixed real wage is used in the 
model.  
 
Table 6. The multiplier effects, under three alternative labour market closures and 
different assumptions on market structures 
  Regions EU 
     PC WC FRW   PC  WC FRW 
Perfect 
competition 
0.14 0.34 0.93 -0.10 0.10 3.04 
0.06 0.13 0.38 0.39 0.62 0.77 
Monopolistic 
competition 
0.13 0.31 0.93 -0.14 -0.03 3.04 
0.06 0.13 0.38 0.40 0.68 0.77 
Bertrand 
0.13 0.31 0.93 -0.14 -0.03 3.08 
0.06 0.13 0.38 0.40 0.68 0.80 
Cournout 
0.13 0.31 0.94 -0.14 -0.03 3.24 
0.06 0.13 0.41 0.40 0.68 1.31 
              
Standard deviation in brackets. PC: Phillips curve. WC: Wage curve. FRW: Fixed real wages. Source: Author's 
simulations 
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In order to see how the geographical shapes of the internal multiplier effects change by 
gradually reducing wage pressure in the system, in Figure 11 we plot the z-scores 
calculated on the multipliers computed in all the 267 perturbed regions: the fixed real 
wage case on the left-hand panel, wage curve on the central panel and the Phillips curve 
on the right-hand panel. Z-scores show us how many standard deviations a single region 
multiplier is above or below the average multipliers. Red colours in the figures represent 
negative standard scores, meaning that multiplier effects are below average, while blue 
colours denote multipliers above average. Given that the results are qualitatively similar, 
independently of the imperfectly competitive model used, in Figure 11 we only plot the 
scores obtained under monopolistic competition.  
 
Generally we observe a quite significant group of regions that maintain multipliers above 
average regardless the labour market closures assumed. However, other regions, such as 
those belongs to the UK, Spain, Finland or Denmark register below average multipliers 
under some labour market closures and above average multipliers under other labour 
market closures. For instance, several regions in Denmark register below average 
multipliers under Phillips curve, less marked but still below average multipliers under a 
wage curve and finally above average multipliers when real wage rates are fixed.  
 
One of the peculiarities of using imperfectly competitive market structures as those 
operating in RHOMOLO is the possibility to account for changes in firms' entry/exit. 
Firms' entry (exit) means that the system will enjoy larger (fewer) varieties and 
therefore an increase (reduction) in production. Strictly speaking. creation of new 
varieties is positively correlated with positive changes in output. In Table 7 we report the 
average percentage change deviation from base year values registered in the perturbed 
regions for all three labour market closures. Not surprisingly for all three market 
structures assumed greater changes in number of firms are recorded under fixed real 
wage behaviour. Under this closure, pressure on commodity prices disappears and 
therefore negative competitiveness effects are absent linking firm entry/exit simply to 
changes in regional output. On the contrary under upward wage pressure negative 
competitiveness effect limit firm's expansion and thus regional output.   
 
Table 7.Percentage changes in the number of firms 
  Regions 
     PC WC FRW 
Monopolistic 
competition 0.12 0.24 0.56 
Bertrand 0.12 0.24 0.56 
Cournout 0.12 0.24 0.57 
PC: Phillips curve. WC: Wage curve. FRW: Fixed real wages.  
Source: Author's simulations 
 
 
Summing up, our analysis on imperfectly competitive markets highlights that specific 
market structure assumptions seem to play a relatively low role in shaping the results 
after a demand shock. We find that perfectly competitive models generate lower 
multiplier effects only if upward wage pressures are in operation in the model. By 
contrast, fixed real wages tend to provide larger multiplier effects in imperfectly 
competitive models. In terms of spillovers we have observed that perturbed regions 
affect positively the non-perturbed regions only under fixed real wages independently of 
the competitive structure assumed. Again, as for the case of perfectly competitive 
markets, the impact on the REU strictly depends on trade elasticities. Lowering 
substitution possibilities with the ROW will result in positive EU multipliers.
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Figure 11. z-scores under three alternative labour market closures obtained using Monopolistic competition 
 
a) Fixed real wages       b) Wage curve     c) Phillips curve 
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7. Conclusions 
 
An exhaustive theoretical background and analytical framework of the RHOMOLO model 
have been documented along with the discussion of the output derived from some 
stylized and illustrative simulations with the aim to make the reader familiar with the 
economic adjustment mechanisms incorporated into the model.  
 
The RHOMOLO model share some similarities with other macroeconomic models currently 
adopted for policy analysis and policy evaluations existing in the economic literatures. 
However the high spatial dimension and the flexibility of switching among the model's 
closures reveal the peculiarity of the RHOMOLO modelling framework. There is a trade-off 
between mathematical complexity when modelling agents' decisions and geographical 
dimension and between the number of behavioural parameters and uncertainty. In the 
future however we will make an additional effort in order to moderate a number of 
simplified assumptions currently present in the model. For instance, currently under 
construction is a model that is able to accommodate perfect foresights agents and 
incorporate heterogeneous agents to better understand the transmission of the economic 
policies. Furthermore, a specific R&D module consistent with the spatial dimension of the 
RHOMOLO model is presently under construction. Furthermore, in order to reduce the 
uncertainty associated to the parametrization of the model we plan to estimates a 
number of key elasticity parameters that are specific to the regions modelled in 
RHOMOLO. 
 
This Technical Report aims to provide the reader and the potential model users with an 
intuition of the transmission channels and adjustment mechanisms existing in RHOMOLO. 
As already mentioned in the introductory section, the analysis is kept simple to facilitate 
a better understanding of the model's findings. We have simulated a demand shock, 
implemented separately for each of the 267 regions contained in the model, and 
discussed the results. We repeated the same simulations under three alternative labour 
market closures and with three different imperfectly competitive product market 
structures. We have tested the extent to which a gradual increase in the upward pressure 
on wages generated by a domestic increase in demand can affect the magnitude of the 
economic impacts in the long-run and the degree to which this could results in changes in 
trade patterns.  
 
Our modelling exercise yields three key results. First, it demonstrates that the upward 
wage pressure resulting from an internal increase in demand generates losses in 
competitiveness that partially offset the impacts on economic activities. Second, it 
illustrates the potential significance of wage settings in generating regional spillovers, 
finding that their intensity and magnitude are magnified by the introduction of real wage 
rigidities in the model. Finally, the inter-regional trade structure of the economy is 
subject to a larger degree of alteration when upward pressure on prices is higher. This 
last result draws attention to the importance of the labour market institutions when 
assessing trade spillovers. Furthermore we have shown that under fixed real wages the 
system operates in a manner which is rather similar to a Leontief-type model according 
to which spillovers strictly depends on the calibrated shift and share parameters.   
 
A second set of results are related to the changes in the market structures. Our 
modelling experiment reveals that for an increase in internal demand that abstracts from 
supply-side effects, there are differences between the results obtained in perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive market settings, but these are almost negligible. Assuming 
labour market closures that allow upward pressure on wages result in a higher loss of 
competitiveness, thus restraining the expansion in the number of varieties and in turn 
reducing the system-wide economic impact. This is a crucial results stemming from our 
experiment, highlighting how any loss in competitiveness maps into a lower number of 
varieties in the perturbed region.   
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Annex 
 
Annex I List of variables and parameters 
 
Variables 
𝐶𝑟 Aggregate consumption in r 
𝑌𝐶𝑟 Household disposable income 
𝐿𝑟,𝑒 Labour supply/working age population  
𝐾𝑟,𝑖
𝑃  Private capital stock 
𝑃𝑟
𝑐 Consumer price index 
𝑊𝑟,𝑒 Nominal wage rate 
𝑢𝑟,𝑒 Unemployment rate 
𝑇𝑅𝑟 Net transfer to Households from Government 
𝑟𝑘𝑟,𝑖 Rate of return to capital 
𝑁𝑟,𝑖 Number of firms 
𝑐𝑟,𝑖 Household consumption in goods and services for sector i 
𝑃𝑟,𝑖 Armington price index 
𝑆𝑟 Nominal savings 
𝐵𝑟 Government deficit/savings 
𝐺𝑗,𝑟 Government current consumption 
𝐼𝑟
𝑔
 Government capital consumption 
𝑍𝑟′,𝑗 Sectoral output 
𝐼𝑟,𝑖
𝑔𝑆
 Government capital consumption by sectors 
𝑌𝑟,𝑗 Value Added 
𝑉𝑟,𝑗 Aggregate intermediate inputs 
𝑃𝑦𝑟,𝑗 Value added price 
𝑃𝑧𝑟,𝑗 Output price 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑟,𝑗 Intermediate inputs price 
𝐾(𝑔)
𝑑  Public capital services available to firms  
𝐾𝐷𝑟,𝑗 Private capital demand 
𝐿𝐷𝑟,𝑗 Labour demand 
𝑣𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 Intermediate inputs sold by i  and purchase by j  
𝐹𝐶𝑟,𝑗 Fixed costs 
𝑙𝑑𝑟,𝑗,𝑒 Labour demand by sectors and skills 
𝑥𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 Commodity j sold by region r to region r' 
𝑝𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 Commodity price applied by sector r for selling in region r' 
𝜀𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 Perceived elasticity in markup price 
𝑃𝑟 Aggregate Armington price index 
𝑃𝑟,𝑗
∗  Marginal cost 
𝑟𝑤𝑟,𝑒,𝑡 Real wage 
𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑃  Private capital investments 
𝐾𝑟
𝑃 Private capital stock 
𝑢𝑐𝑘𝑟 User cost of capital 
𝐾𝑗,𝑟
∗  Desired level of capital 
𝑝𝐸𝑈
𝐼  Price index of investments 
𝑋𝑟′,𝑗 Armington aggregate 
𝐼𝑖,𝑟
𝑆  Investments by sector of origin 
𝐾(𝑔),𝑟
𝑠  Public capital stock 
𝑚𝑟,𝑒 Net migration rate 
𝑠𝑟,𝑟′,𝑒  Probability of workers moving from r to r' 
Fixed Variables 
𝐹𝐶𝑟,𝑗 Fixed costs 
𝜏𝑟
𝑤 Labour income tax rate 
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𝜏𝑟
𝜋 Capital Income tax rate 
𝜏𝑟
𝑝
 Net production tax rate 
𝜏𝑟,𝑟′,𝑗 Iceberg transport costs 
𝑠𝑟 Saving rate 
𝑟 Interest rate 
Calibrated shifts and shares parameters 
𝜓𝑟 Share of capital income paid directly to households 
𝜗𝑟,𝑖  Share of Households expenditure parameter 
𝑧𝑟,𝑖 Share of public investments 
𝐴𝑥𝑟,𝑗 Scale parameter in output production function 
𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑥  Calibrated share of intermediate inputs in total production 
𝐴𝑦𝑟,𝑗 Scale parameter in value added production function 
𝛿𝑟,𝑗
𝑌  Share of capital in Value added 
𝑏𝑟,𝑖,𝑗 Intermediate inputs shares 
𝐴𝑙𝑟,𝑗,𝑒 Scale parameter in labour function 
𝛿𝑟,𝑗,𝑒 Share of labour skills in total employment 
𝑑𝑟,𝑟′,𝑖, Calibrated expenditure shares in Armington function 
𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝑦
 Leontief coefficient for value added 
𝑎𝑟,𝑗
𝐼𝑛𝑡 Leontief coefficient for intermediates 
𝐾𝑀𝑖,𝑗,𝑟 Capital matrix 
Elasticity of substitutions and other behavioural parameters 
𝜌𝑐 Parameter for the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods 
𝜎𝑐 Elasticity of substitution between consumption goods 
𝜌𝑗
𝑥 Parameter for the elasticity of substitution between value added and 
intermediate 
𝜎𝑥 Elasticity of substitution between between value added and intermediate 
𝜉 Public capital elasticity 
𝜌𝑗
𝑦
 Parameter for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 
𝜎𝑦 Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 
𝜌𝑣 Parameter for the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs 
𝜎𝑣 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs 
𝜌𝑗
𝑙 Parameter for the elasticity of substitution between labour skills 
𝜎𝑗
𝑙 Elasticity of substitution between labour skills 
𝜎𝑗 Armington trade elasticity 
𝛼 Elasticity for lag real wage in real wage equations 
𝜁 Elasticity for unemployment rate in real wage equation 
𝜍 Elasticity for changes output price rate in real wage equations 
𝜃 Elasticity for changes in unemployment rate in real wage equations 
𝑣 Elasticity of the cost of capital/accelerator elasticity 
𝛾 Parameter in the congestion specification 
𝜂 Congestion effects 
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Annex II Selected calibrated share parameters 
 
Figure A 1. Relationship between number of firms and GDP for each of the imperfectly 
competitive sectors 
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Figure A1 (continue) 
Sector G-I 
Sector J 
Sector K-L 
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Figure A1 (continue) 
 
Sector M-N 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 2. The share of total imports (horizontal line) vs the share of total export 
(vertical line) 
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Figure A 3. The share of non-EU imports (horizontal line) vs the share of non-EU export 
(vertical line) 
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